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Abstract
Mixing Biometric Data For Generating Joint Identities and Preserving Privacy
by
Asem A. Othman
Doctor of Philosophy in Electrical Engineering
West Virginia University
Arun A. Ross, Ph.D., Chair
Biometrics is the science of automatically recognizing individuals by utilizing biological traits
such as fingerprints, face, iris and voice. A classical biometric system digitizes the human body
and uses this digitized identity for human recognition. In this work, we introduce the concept of
mixing biometrics. Mixing biometrics refers to the processof generating a new biometric image
by fusing images of different fingers, different faces, or different irises. The resultant mixed
image can be used directly in the feature extraction and matching stages of an existing biometric
system. In this regard, we design and systematically evaluate novel methods for generating mixed
images for the fingerprint, iris and face modalities. Further, we extend the concept of mixing to
accommodate two distinct modalities of an individual, viz., fingerprint and iris. The utility of
mixing biometrics is demonstrated in two different applications. The first application deals with
the issue of generating a joint digital identity. A joint identity inherits its uniqueness from two
or more individuals and can be used in scenarios such as jointbank accounts or two-man rule
systems. The second application deals with the issue of biometric privacy, where the concept of
mixing is used for de-identifying or obscuring biometric images and for generating cancelable
biometrics. Extensive experimental analysis suggests thathe concept of biometric mixing has
several benefits and can be easily incorporated into existing biometric systems.
To my family.
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1.1 Identity Authentication In Digital Era
Over the course of human history, individuals have been asked to identify themselves in vari-
ous scenarios; and legal names, address, tokens, pseudonyms, etc. have been used for this purpose
[12] [13]. In our vast interconnected world, the need for reliable identity authentication tech-
niques has become of paramount importance. The emergence ofbiometrics has addressed some
of these needs. Biometrics refers to the science of establishing individuals’ identities based on
their physical and behavioral traits such as fingerprints, face, iris, voice and gait [14]. Compared
to traditional authentication schemes that are knowledge-based (e.g., passwords) or token-based
(e.g., smart cards), biometric-based systems are considered convenient (the user does not have to
memorize passwords or possess proof of identity such as ID cards) nd secure (the impostors can
be deterred or detected easily) [15]. Hence, biometric system have been deployed in numerous
commercial, civilian and forensic applications to establish identities. Figure 1.1 shows examples
of biometric traits used for establishing individuals’ identities.
Biometric-based recognition systems rely on the comparison of a digital representation of a
physical or behavioral trait with a previously recorded onef the same trait. The first step in
all biometric systems is acquiring the raw biometric data. The device used to acquire biometric
data varies based on the type of the trait. For example, an optical sensor is typically used to
scan a fingerprint or palm and a digital camera is used to capture facial images or certain aspects
of the retina or iris. This sensor or camera generates a digital mage of the biometric. Next, in
most biometric systems, the observed raw biometric data (i.e., image) is reduced into a set of
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Figure 1.1: Examples of some of the biometrics traits used for authenticating an individual.
Physical traits include face, fingerprint, iris, retina, palmprint, hand geometry, tooth, ear and
ocular, while gait, signature and keystroke dynamics are some f the behavioral characteristics.
Voice has been traditionally viewed as being physical or as behavioral characteristic.
salient characteristics (i.e., feature set). These featursets are approximations of the acquired
images, but contain more discriminatory and invariant information than the raw digital data. Fi-
nally, the biometric system checks whether the extracted featur set has a matching template in
the database. Depending on the application, a biometric system could be either a verification
system or an identification system. A verification system compares the extracted feature set with
a recorded template of a claimed identity. A verification system is referred as a 1-to-1 matching
system. On the other hand, an identification system identifies an individual by matching the ex-
tracted feature set against all recorded templates in orderto determine a match. An identification
system is referred as a 1-to-N matching system.
Abstractly, biometric systems digitize our physical body in order to recognize us, which im-
plies a certain degree of simplification, and modifies the nature of our identities. An identity
from an individual’s perspective is related to their self-image (an individual’s mental model of
him or herself), self-esteem and perceived individuality within a given society [16]. The digital
representations (created by biometric systems) of body traits ypically lead to the exclusion of all
details except those that are relevant for human recognition in a specific application. So biomet-
ric systems attempt t0 reduce the individual into a digital persona [17], that can be measured and
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-hopefully-matched.
The thrust of biometrics involves transferring identitiesfrom an individual’s body to an exter-
nal electronic digital persona. Although, this transfer raises the controversial issue [12, 18] that
biometric systems are digitizing (i.e., oversimplifying)our physical body and living identities
into passwords (i.e, feature templates), our research relies on this ability to digitize the human
body. First we provide more details about a biometric systemb fore introducing the focus of this
research.
1.2 Biometric System
A biometric recognition system (or simply a biometric system) is a pattern recognition system
that recognizes individuals based on their biometric trait(s) [15]. A typical biometric system
consists of four main modules: (i) sensor module that captures samples of a biometric trait,
(ii) feature extraction module that extracts certain salient f atures from the raw biometric data
captured by the sensor, (iii) database module that stores the features extracted by the feature
extraction module along with some biographic or other pertin nt labels, and (iv) matcher module
that matches the features extracted from the biometric samples with the features stored in the
system database. These modules will operate in two main stages: enrollment and recognition.
The enrollment stage generates a digital representation ofan individual’s biometric trait and
then stores this representation (in some cases, the original raw data is also stored) in the system
database. The recognition stage falls into two different categories: verification and identification.
Verification involves confirming or denying an individual’sclaimed identity - “Am I who I claim I
am?”. These systems are referred as 1-to-1 authentication systems, as a probe is compared against
a single (or relatively small) number of gallery entries. Identification involves establishing an
individual’s identity - “Who am I?”. These systems are referred as 1-to-N authentication systems,
as the entire database is typically searched during the recogniti n stage. Figure 1.2 shows a block
diagram of a typical biometric recognition system.
The following terminologies related to biometric systems will be adopted in this thesis:
• Biometric trait: A physical or behavioral trait of an individual that is sensed, processed and
matched for person verification/identification. Examples include fingerprint, face, voice,
iris and gait.
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Figure 1.2: An example of a typical biometric recognition system which depicts the enrollment
(top) and recognition (bottom) stages of a fingerprint recognition system.T denotes the feature
vector that is extracted from the image during enrollment and stored as a template in the system
database.Q denotes the probe feature set.
• Biometric instance: A specific instance of a biometric traitsuch as the left eye or the right
index finger.
• Biometric sample: The snapshot of a specific instance of an individual’s biometric trait
captured by a biometric sensor such as the impression of the rig t index finger or the image
of a face.
• Biometric template (or simply template): The features extracted from a biometric sample
acquired during user enrollment and stored in the system database.
• Biometric gallery (or simply gallery): The biometric samples labeled with user identities
that are stored in the biometric database.
• Biometric probe (or simply probe): The biometric sample provided by a user during recog-
nition.
We observe that classical biometric systems generate asingledigital identity corresponding
to a single individual during the enrollment and recognitiostages. This digital identity is stored
in the database. Moreover, preserving the privacy of the stored digital identity is necessary to
mitigate concerns related to data sharing and data misuse [19]. This has heightened the need
to impart privacy to the stored digital identity. In this thesis, we explore the notion of mixing
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biometrics. Mixing biometrics generates a new biometric image by fusing multiple biometric
images pertaining to a single or different individuals. Thegenerated image can be considered as
a digital representation of ajoint identity (i.e., a virtual identity) that inherits its uniqueness from
two different individuals. The mixing biometrics concept alsocan be used to transform a bio-
metric template into a revocable (i.e., changeable) template that protects the privacy of biometric
data. Consequently, mixing biometrics has benefits (as willbe discussed in the following section)
over traditional biometric systems in terms of storage and security.
1.3 Research objective: Mixing Biometrics
Observed physical attributes of an individual are capturedin pixel space (i.e., images) and
then deterministically transformed to a lower dimensionalfe ture space (i.e., templates). Mixing
biometrics consolidates two different biometric images pertaining to different identities (e.g.,
fingerprint images of Alice and Bob) or to different instances of the same individual (e.g., left
and right index fingerprints of Alice). Consolidating biometrics of different identities at image
level (instead of feature level) has the benefit that different f ature extraction algorithms can be
used to compute the features of the mixed image. This means the mixed images can be used in
different applications. The concept of biometrics mixing can be utilized in the following ways.
1.3.1 Generating joint identities
Mixing biometrics can be used to create a joint digital identity that pertains to multiple in-
dividuals instead of a single individual. A joint identity is a digital identity that inherits its
uniqueness from two (or more) different individuals. In thefollowing scenarios, generating joint
identities would be preferable.
Scenario 1:
To achieve a high level of secure authentication, governments have implemented two-man
rule accessing mechanism in some government buildings, military installations, laboratories such
as those dealing with nuclear material [20], poisonous substances, etc. The joint identity concept
can be used in these safety critical applications where the presence of two people is required be-
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fore a potentially hazardous operation can be performed. Inother words, the authentication pro-
cess relies on verifying the presence of two authorized ident ti s by presenting their biometrics
simultaneously. For instance, in the case of missile launching, two officers must agree that the
launch order is valid and both crew members must turn their keys simultaneously to launch the
missile. By adopting the joint identity concept, their biometrics could be used to prevent acciden-
tal or malicious actions. Hence, their biometrics could be us d to generate joint identities in such
a way that a successful authentication can be guaranteed only when both persons are providing
their biometrics simultaneously.
Scenario 2:
Another benefit of a joint identity is in banking applications. A joint account is a bank ac-
count shared by two or more individuals. Any individual who is a member of the joint account
can withdraw from the account and deposit to it. Here, the joint identity concept could be uti-
lized to generate a biometric template of this joint identity. Then, this template can be positively
matched with either a single biometric probe from one of the owners, or a mixed biometric probe
generated by mixing the probe samples of the two owners. In both cases the access to the joint
account is guaranteed by performing one verification comparison.
Based on the described scenarios, joint identities can be categorized into identities that are
dissimilaror similar to the original identities, which were mixed to generate it.
1.3.2 Preserving privacy
Although biometrics-based systems are reliable approaches to personal identification and
verification, traditional authentication systems still have one advantage over biometrics-based
systems. Tokens such as smart cards or passwords can be revokd easily when they are com-
promised; on the other hand, the user has a limited number of biometrics (e.g., one face, two
irises, etc). Moreover, there is the possibility of sharinga d misusing of the biometrics data be-
tween different agencies. Therefore, there are growing concerns about biometricfunction creep.
A company that scans the iris of a user might also allow governm nt or commercial entities to
compare this biometric data against their own databases without user’s knowledge. In some in-
stances, biometrics data may have to be transmitted across networks with the user’s knowledge.
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Also, biometric templates tend to reveal private information about a user such as race, gender and
certain health conditions [12]. Those issues have heightened the need to accord privacy to the
user by adequately protecting the contents of the databasesof biometrics systems.
Conventional cryptography provides numerous approaches and algorithms to secure impor-
tant data/images. However, there are two main concerns whenit comes to encrypting biometric
templates ( i.e., the stored features). First, the securityof he cryptographic algorithms relies on
the assumption that the cryptographic keys are known only tothe legitimate user. Maintaining
the secrecy of keys is one of the main challenges in practicalcryptosystems. Second, during
every identification/verification attempt, the stored template has to be decrypted. Thus, the orig-
inal biometric template will be exposed to eavesdroppers. The stolen templates could be used to
reconstruct the original biomertics images [21, 22, 23, 24,25]. In other words, compromising a
biometric template may result in the loss of a subject’s identity.
Therefore, there are two major requirements with regards toprotecting biometric templates
[26, 27, 28]:
1. Non-invertibility (Irreversibility): It must be computa ionally infeasible to recover the orig-
inal biometric image/data from the stored template.
2. Cancelability (Unlinkability): Different versions of protected biometric templates can be
generated based on the same biometric data (renewability),while protected templates should
not allow cross-matching between different applications (diversity).
In order to fulfill these requirements, a number of techniques have been proposed to limit the
amount of information that can be easily extracted from a stored template. Template protec-
tion techniques can be broadly categorized into biometric cryptosystems and de-identifying tech-
niques [27, 28].
Biometric cryptosystems [26, 27, 28] offer solutions to biometric-dependent key-release
and biometric template protection. In these systems, a cryptographic key is secured by using
biometric template or directly generating a cryptographickey from the biometric template. In
a biometric cryptosystem, some public information about the biometric template is stored and
referred to as helper data. The helper data does not reveal any significant information about the
original biometric template, but needed during matching toextract a cryptographic key from the
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probe biometric template. Matching is performed indirectly by verifying the validity of the ex-
tracted key. Nevertheless, biometric cryptosystems generally result in a noticeable decrease in
recognition performance. This is because cryptosystems introduce a higher degree of quantiza-
tion in the feature extraction module.
De-identifying a biometric image means intentionally changing the biometric content of the
image. De-identifying function should allow matching of biometric templates in the transformed
domain and should be noninvertible in order to protect the identity even if the transformation
function and its parameters are compromised [27, 28]. The de-identified biometric image is typ-
ically referred to as a private template [29] or a cancelablebiometric [30]. Ratha et al. [30]
suggested that templates of the cancelable biometric should be in the same image or data space
after transformation which allows the use of existing feature extraction and matching algorithms.
Hence, the transformation functions are severely constraied because the space of the biometric
images or data should not be changed after the process (e.g.,th cancelable face image is a face
image and the cancelable fingerprint image is a fingerprint image). So there is a trade-off between
the recognition performance and security.
In mixing biometrics, the biometric images pertaining to different individuals are utilized to
generate joint, unique, and revocable digitized identities. Therefore, this concept could be con-
sidered as an alternative approach to transform the biometric data by mixing them. For instance,
mixing fingerprints can be used to de-identify an input fingerprint image by fusing it with another
fingerprint (e.g., from a different finger) at image level, inorder to produce different mixed im-
ages that obscure the identity of the original fingerprints.This allows cancelability in biometrics
systems. A user can revoke a template that has been compromised and generate a new template
that cannot be easily guessed using the compromised template.
1.4 Mixing Biometrics: An information fusion exercise
Mixing biometrics may be viewed as an exercise in information fusion in general, and im-
age level fusion in particular. For instance, our proposed concept of mixing biometrics could be
utilized in multi-instance systems. The left and right thumbs, the left and right irises, or even a
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fingerprint and an iris of an individual may be fused and used to verify an individual’s identity. In
the following sections, we will provide an overview of multibiometric fusion and different image
level fusion approaches. Finally, a brief comparison betwen mixing biometrics and multibio-
metric fusion is made.
1.4.1 Multibiometric Fusion
Consolidating multiple sources of an individual’s digitized representations (e.g., multiple fin-
gerprint images, multiple matchers operating on a single trait, or multiple traits such as fingerprint
and iris) solves some of the limitations of unimodal biometric systems (e.g., population coverage,
or spoof attacks) [31]. Although, the development of multibiometric systems was considered to
be the logical extension of traditional unimodal approaches, there is a need for reliable multi-
modal fusion algorithms to consolidate different biometric representations. Therefore, there has
been a substantial amount of work done on multibiometric fusion approaches. This involves
combining biometric information at the image, feature extraction, match score, or decision level.
The different levels of fusion can be broadly categorized asfollows [31, 32]:
1. Fusion prior to matching.
• Image level fusion: The raw data from the sensor(s) are combined.
• Feature level fusion: The different feature sets extractedfrom multiple biometric
sources are combined.
2. Fusion after matching.
• Score level fusion : The matching scores output by differentbiometric matchers are
combined in order to assist the final recognition decision.
• Rank level fusion: The output of each biometric system is a subset of possible matches
(i.e., identities) sorted in decreasing order of confidence, these subsets of identities are
combined. This is relevant in an identification system wherea ank may be assigned
to the top matching identities.
• Decision level fusion: The decisions output by the individual biometric matchers are
combined.
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1.4.2 Image Level Fusion
Image fusion is a process of combining information from different images into a composite
that is suitable for post processing tasks, such as classification, recognition and tracking [33].
Image level fusion is the first fusion route for biometric data in a multibiometric system. In the
context of multibiometrics, image level fusion entails theconsolidation of evidence presented by
multiple sources of raw data before they are subjected to featur extraction. In order to accom-
modate other types of raw biometric data such as voice, video, text, etc; the phrasessignal level
fusionandsensor level fusionare also used [31].
The fusion in this early stage of a multibiometric system hast e benefit that different application-
specific feature extraction algorithms could be used to compute the features from the fused data.
So the fused image could be used in different applications and fusion algorithms at other differ-
ent levels could be applied on it. For example, a mixed fingerprint image could be fused with
a mixed iris image at the score level. Till date, a number of image level fusion algorithms have
been proposed and we provide a brief overview of these algorithms in the following section.
Literature Review
Image level fusion has been actively utilized in different multibiometric systems. However,
this level of fusion is the least explored compared to the other levels of fusion in the context
of biometrics. The work done on the fusion of raw biometric data can be classified into three
categories [34]:
1. Single sensor, single trait: This category of image levelfusion can benefit biometric sys-
tems that acquire multiple samples of the same trait using a single sensor. Fusing those
samples can account for variations that occur in a biometrictra t. For example, partial
fingerprint images or different profiles image of a face can becombined to obtain a fused
representation of the fingerprint or the face image, respectively, which can address the chal-
lenges due to the limitation of small fingerprints sensors orthe pose variations between face
images. Note that fusing multiple samples of a biometric trait does not necessarily model
the intra-user variations. It utilizes the acquired samples of the biometric trait to generate
a composite probe or gallery image. Generating a composite representation of different
samples of a biometric trait has the following merits [31]: (a) when multiple samples of a
subject’s trait are available at the time of enrollment, instead of storing these samples as
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independent entities, they are fused into a single entity toreduce the probability of a false
reject and the matching time, and (b) consolidating the evidence presented by multiple
samples of the same biometric alleviates the problem of template selection.
In the context of fingerprints, this category of image fusionhas been used to combine mul-
tiple impressions of the same finger as exemplified in the following scenarios:
Small-area sensor:Some sensors capture only a small portion of the fingertip [35]. There-
fore, several fingerprint mosaicking techniques [36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42] have been de-
veloped to stitch multiple impressions of the same finger andcreate a larger fingerprint.
Multi-view sensor: Touchless fingerprint sensors capture multiple views of a finger using
several calibrated cameras [43] or a single camera with two planar mirrors [44]. These
multiple views are mosaicked together to yield a single nail-to-nail fingerprint.
Multispectral sensor: Rowe et al. [45] fused multiple images acquired from a multispec-
tral fingerprint scanner into a single high quality fingerprint image by utilizing a wavelet-
based method of image fusion.
In the context of faces, multiple 2D face images obtained from different viewpoints can be
stitched together to form a 3D model of the face [46] or a panormic face mosaic [47][48].
In the context of irises, Hollingsworth et al. [49] and Jillela t al. [50] took advantage of the
temporal continuity in videos to improve matching performance using image level fusion.
From multiple frames of a frontal iris video, they created a single image. They concluded
that using fused iris images for matching resulted in a performance which is comparable
to state of the art score level fusion techniques, with less computational burden. Moreover,
fusing irises in image domain has been proposed in Zuo et al.’s work to de-identify nor-
malized iris images [51]. They proposed a GRAY-SALT transformation [51] to de-identify
irises by adding a synthetic iris image to the original iris image.
2. Multi-sensors, single trait: In this category, samples ar acquired by multiple senors instead
of using a single sensor. The information obtained from multiple sensors are complemen-
tary to each other, and can augment the biometric content andmi imize the intra-user
variability. In the literature, this category of image level fusion has been used in face iden-
tification systems to minimize the variations due to facial appearance (e.g., hairs, wrinkles,
and expression) and the effects due to changes in pose and illumination. Hence, researchers
have fused the visible spectrum images with near infrared images [52, 53, 54, 55] and with
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the corresponding 3D scan (i.e., the range image) in order tocreate a 3D texture [56, 57].
3. Multibiometric: The previous categories of image level fusion were employed in unimodal
biometric systems. However, there has also been some research conducted in fusing im-
ages of different biometric traits into a single composite image. The fused multibiometric
image can address issues such as memory storage [58] and small sa p e size recognition
[59]. Jing et al. [59] generated a composite image from face and palmprint biometrics
by concatenating the responses of different Gabor filters. The resulted image is not in the
same image or data space of the face or palmprint images. Therefor , during authentica-
tion, kernel discriminative common vectors are extracted from the fused image and radial
basis function based neural network is used for classification. Noore et al. [58] developed
a fusion algorithm which is based on multi-level discrete wavelet transform to fuse images
of four biometric traits (i.e., face, iris, fingerprint, andsignature). Here, the resulted image
is a scrambled multimodal biometric image and special reconstruction procedures are used
to reconstruct the original images and perform authentication. Liu et al. [60] fused the
phase of a normalized iris and a palmprint image by using BaudLimited 2D-IDFT. But the
fused image can only be matched with a stored template by using a special matcher, i.e.,
a phase-based image matcher and they did not analyze if the fused image is a cancelable
template or not.
1.4.3 Mixing BiometricsversusMultibiometric fusion
First of all, deploying a multibiometric system improves the recognition performance by con-
solidating multiple biometric sources of a single individual (i.e., it increases the biometric content
of the digital identity of a specific individual). On the other hand, one objective of mixing bio-
metrics is to generate a joint identity, whose uniqueness pertains to multiple individuals. There-
fore, the biometric samples, i.e., images will be fused to generate a new biometric image.
Second, although generating a biometric image is possible by traditional image level fusion
approaches (see Section 1.4.2), the sources have to be sample of the same biometric instance
obtained from a single sensor or multiple compatible sensors. In other words, traditional image
level fusion augments the biometric content of the templatepertaining to a single individual
by fusing multiple samples of the same instance of a biometric trait. On the contrary, mixing
biometrics generates a new biometric image by fusing imagesof different biometric instances
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pertaining to single or different individuals.
Moreover, as described in Section 1.4.2, to fuse biometricssamples at image level, these
samples must be compatible, and the correspondences between raw data must be either known in
advance or reliably estimated. Therefore, the traditionalim ge level fusion approaches cannot be
directly used for mixing biometrics images of different indivi uals. This is because it is difficult
to ensure the existence of such correspondences between twobiometric samples acquired from
different individuals or instances.
Finally, the multibiometric approach improves the accuracy of the system over its individual
unimodal components, but this improvement comes at a cost. Multibiometric systems may be
viewed as combinations of two or more unimodal biometric system . Each unimodal system has
its own feature extractor and matcher. Thus, fusing their features, scores or decisions requires
additional time. On the other hand, these systems could be cost-effective if a single image is used
in the matching step. Hence, the concept of mixing biometrics could provide benefits with regards
to storage and security. For example, when images of a subject’s index and thumb are available
at the time of enrollment, a common approach is to store theseimages as independent galleries.
Thus, when probe images of these fingers are acquired, each probe image is compared against
the corresponding gallery image independently. The resulting set of scores can be consolidated
to generate a single score (e.g., via the sum rule). However,in the case of mixing biometrics,
images of a subject’s fingers are mixed into a single image. This mixed image will be stored at
the time of enrollment and during the authentication it willbe matched against a single mixed
probe image.
Although there are stated differences between mixing biometrics (as a concept) and multibio-
metrics fusion (as deployed systems), mixing biometrics isstill a multibiometric fusion exercise
by definition [31]. We believe that mixing biometrics extends and boosts the biometrics concept
in general, and the multibiometrics fusion concept in particular. Therefore, in this thesis, we will
introduce different approaches in order to mix different biometric traits.
1.5 Thesis Contributions
In this thesis, we explore the possibility of generating a biometric template that inherits its
characteristics from different individuals or instances.This section provides an overview of the
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thesis organization and approaches designed to accomplishour research objective.
In Chapter 2 we will discuss the use of fingerprints, faces andirises as biometrics. The
purpose of this chapter is to give a brief introduction to biometric traits that have been utilized in
the thesis. The reader can skip this chapter without any lossof continuity.
In Chapter 3 we describe a method to protect the privacy of fingerprint templates by mixing
images to generate a cancelable fingerprint image. To mix twofingerprints, each fingerprint
pattern is decomposed into two different components, viz.,the continuous and spiral components
by viewing the patterns as holograms. After pre-aligning the components of each fingerprint,
the continuous component of one fingerprint is combined withthe spiral component of the other
fingerprint.
Chapters 4 and 5 present methods for mixing faces and irises,eceptively, in order to generate
joint identities that are similar to the original identities (as in scenario 2 in Section 1.3.1). The
mixed face image is an intermediate face image in the morphing co tinuum between two faces
and its position on this continuum is specified by the mixing parameters. In the case of iris, in
order to mix two iris patterns, horizontal seams are copied from normalized iris images into a
new iris image after sorting them based on their importance ithe images.
In Chapter 6, the mixing concept is utilized in a different manner. Here, the mixed image
corresponds to a true identity (and is not a virtual identity); however, the components of the mixed
image are obtained from other identities. Therefore, we invstigate the possibility of dithering
a private face image into two host face images such that the private image can be revealed only
when dithered host images are simultaneously available; atthe same time, the individual dithered
host images do not reveal the identity of the private image.
In Chapter 7, we extend the concept of mixing in order to mix insta ces ofdifferentbiometric
traits to obscure the original identity. Specifically, the goal here is generating a new mixed image
that inherits its uniqueness from a finger impression and an iris image, i.e., a fingerprint image
and an annular iris image are mixed in order to generate a fing’iris’print image. This mixed image
incorporates characteristics from the original fingerprint impression and iris image, and can be
used directly in the feature extraction and matching stagesof an existing fingerprint system.
To mix a fingerprint with an iris, the fingerprint is decomposed into two components, viz., the
continuous and spiral phases, and iris minutiae is extracted in order to generate the iris spiral
phase. Then, the continuous phase of the fingerprint is combined with the spiral phase of the
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annular iris image.
In all cases, extensive experiments are conducted to conveythe benefits and limitations of the
proposed concepts.





The purpose of this chapter is to give a brief introduction about different biometric traits, i.e.,
fingerprint, face, and iris, that have been discussed in the thesis.
2.2 From anthropometry to biometrics
In the nineteenth century, Alphonse Bertillon [1], a Frenchpoliceman, was the first to intro-
duce the science of identifying a person based on his/her anatomical features. To identify repeat
offenders, Alphonse built a set of tools referred to in contemporary literature as the Bertillonage
system. These tools were used to measure certain anatomicaltra ts of a person including eleven
different body measurements such as height, length, and brea th of the head, the width of cheeks,
the length of different fingers, the length of forearms, etc.Figure 2.1 shows an illustration of the
process for acquiring these measurements. These measurements were then recorded on an iden-
tity card (as shown in Figure 2.2) and/or manually compared to a record database to check if the
same person was convicted before. The system was used until 1903, when it was replaced by
fingerprint records. But a few elements of the Bertillon system exist even today in the criminal
police identification process, such as the combination of prfile and frontal shots, i.e., mug shots
when photographing offenders (see Figure 2.3).
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Figure 2.1: Anthropometry measurements used in Bertillonage identification system (taken from
[1])
Asem A. Othman Chapter 2. Biometric Traits 18
Figure 2.2: The ID card of Francis Galton as per the Bertillonage system (taken from [2]) created
during Galton’s visit to Bertillon’s laboratory in 1893.
Figure 2.3: Mugshot of Alphonse Bertillon (taken from [3]).
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2.3 Fingerprint as a biometric
The complexity of the Bertillonage system was the reason forpr viding criminal identifica-
tion systems with accurate and reliable data, but it was alsothe reason for the system’s downfall.
Therefore, the supremacy of the Bertillon system began to fade in the face of a new (at that time)
identification technique, i.e., fingerprint identificationwhich was simpler to administer than the
Bertillon anthropometry system. The use of fingerprints forestablishing identity was started
in the 16th century and thereafter replaced Bertillonage system as the world-wide standard for
criminal identification.
A fingerprint refers to the flow of ridge patterns in the tip of the finger. The ridge flow exhibits
irregularities in local regions of the fingertip termed as minut ae points (Figure 2.4). In 1892, Sir
Francis Galton used the minutiae features for fingerprint matching. Since then, the distribution of
these minutiae points along with the associated ridge structure has been believed to be distinctive
to each fingerprint, and has been used in individual identifica on records in police offices.
Figure 2.4: A fingerprint image. The red circles represent some f the irregularities in the finger-
print,i.e.,the minutiae points.
Fingerprints recognition systems are considered to be a reli bl method to recognize indi-
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viduals and are used in different biometric applications, such as physical access control, border
security, watch list, background check, and national ID system .
2.3.1 Representation and matching
The uniqueness of a fingerprint is predominantly determinedby the local ridge characteristics
and their relationships, and matching fingerprints manually to claim that two impressions belong
to the same person, requires complex protocols that have been used by examiners. Over the
last three decades, research in fingerprint recognition hasseen tremendous growth; however,
most automatic fingerprint matchers follow similar protocols as human examiners and depend on
the ridge characteristics of fingerprints. These characteristics (i.e., fingerprint features) can be
organized in a hierarchical order [35] at three different leve s. Level 1 features include the ridge
flow, pattern type, external fingerprint shape, orientationimage, and frequency image; level 2
features consist of minutiae location and orientation; andlevel 3 features consist of information
available at higher resolution images, such as local shape of ridges, dots, pores and incipient
ridges. On the basis of the described hierarchical order, fingerprint matching can be accomplished
using three classes of matchers [35].
Level 1 features matchers
The matchers of this class compare the global pattern of ridges, e.g., correlation based match-
ers. During the matching procedures, the fingerprint or the global ridge orientation images are
superimposed on each other and the correlation between the corresponding pixel intensities is
computed for different alignments (e.g., various displacements and rotations). In general, it has
been reported [35] that the level 1 features are useful for fingerprint classification and indexing,
but not sufficient for fingerprint matching.
Level 2 features matchers
These are the most popular matchers whereby minutiae pointsare extracted from the finger-
print to be matched, and their location and ridge orientations are stored as a fingerprint template
in a central database. The matching process determines the alignment between two minutiae sets
that results in the maximum number of minutiae pairings. Some matchers utilize the level 1 fea-
tures, such as texture information, local orientation, frequency and/or ridge pattern, along with
Asem A. Othman Chapter 2. Biometric Traits 21
the extracted minutiae, to match two fingerprints.
Level 3 features matchers
This class of matchers is the least explored by researchers [35], compared to level 2 features
matchers. This is due to two major reasons; (1) robust extraction of level 3 features (e.g., ridge
shapes, sweat pores) requires high resolution images (≥ 1,000 ppi - number of pixels per inch in
the image) compared to 500 ppi, i.e., the current FBI standard [35]; and (2) even with availability
of good quality images, these matchers require high computational complexity. These reasons
has made the practicality of using these matchers for some comercial applications debatable.
However, level 3 features play a significant role in latent fingerprint matching, where fingerprints
are lifted from a surface prior to digitizing them.
2.4 Face as a biometric
Extracting intrinsic information from faces, such as identity, gender, ethnicity and age, is a
task that humans perform routinely and efficiently. Therefor , the availability of powerful and
low-cost computing systems has created an interest in developing automatic face recognition sys-
tems and deploying them in a number of applications, including biometric-based access systems.
Automatic face recognition represents a challenging problem in the field of image analysis and
computer vision. Thus, research in face recognition is striving to (a) solve fundamental chal-
lenges such as developing face matching methods that are invaria t to age, pose, illumination,
and facial expressions; (b) utilize the advances in technologies such as digital cameras and mo-
bile devices to perform face recognition in new applications a d scenarios; and (c) fulfill the
increased demands on security in numerous practical applictions where human identification is
needed.
2.4.1 Representation and matching
To identify a face in a digital image, the face recognition system should automatically find
the faces in the image (if there is one), and then the recogniti n occurs by matching the detected
face with the face template in a database. Just as in the case of fingerprints (see section 2.3),
where ridge details were described in a hierarchical order at three different levels, Klare and Jain
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[4] developed a hierarchical order for describing facial fetures (see Figure 2.5).
Level 1 features are the facial characteristics that can be obs rved from the general appearance
of the face, such as skin color. Level 2 features are the localized characteristics of the face,
such as the shape of the face and the relationship among the facial attributes. Finally, level 3
characteristics are the micro features that can be useful for the discrimination of monozygotic
(i.e., identical) twins [61], such as facial marks.
(a) A face image
(b)Level 1 feature: skin color (c) Level 2 feature: face shape (d) Level 3 feature: face marks
Figure 2.5: Examples of the three levels of facial features (adopted from [4]).
Face matching is the process of measuring the similarity or dissimilarity between two face
image based on the extracted features. Level 1 face featuresare quite analogous to level 1 finger-
print features. Hence, level 1 face features cannot accurately identify an individual over a large
population of candidates. Similarly, as level 2 features offingerprints, level 2 face features are the
most discriminative features, and are predominantly used for face recognition approaches. There
Asem A. Othman Chapter 2. Biometric Traits 23
are two broad categories of main approaches to match the detected face images [62]: appearance-
based and feature-based methods. Appearance-based methods consider the global properties of
the face image intensity pattern such as Principal Component Analysis (PCA), Linear Discrimi-
nant Analysis (LDA), and Independent Component Analysis (ICA). Feature-based methods are
using local features of the face such as geometric relationsbetween the facial features and local
texture features of the face that are in variant to pose and lighting such as gradient orientations
and local binary patterns (LBP). Meanwhile, Level 3 features contain unstructured, micro level
features on the face that includes scars and facial marks. These features have been used along
with level 2 features to identify monozygotic twins [63].
2.5 Iris as a biometric
Irises exhibit an extraordinary amount of textural detailsthat are believed [64] to be different
between individuals and between different eyes of the same individual. The texture of an iris
can be simply described as a multilayered, tangled mesh-like structure, which imparts a highly
complex texture to its surface. Figure 2.6 provides a close-up view of the texture of a sample iris.
Compared with fingerprints, iris image data acquisition is usually non-invasive. Thus the iris has
become one of the most reliable biometric traits for identity verification and recognition.
Figure 2.6: Close-up view of an iris, showing its complex texture. Image taken from [5].
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2.5.1 Representation and matching
The texture of iris is formed by many interlacing minute characteristics such as pigment spots,
stripes, furrows, crypts, etc. that are embedded on a stroma. [64]. Based on these features, the
recognition takes place. But, prior to recognition, the iris region must first be localized and seg-
mented from an image of the eye. Errors in the segmentation step will lead to poor performance
due to the inclusion of noise (e.g. eyelashes, sclera, pupil, eye ids, and specular reflection) in the
image.
Several iris representation techniques have been proposedin the literature [64, 65] and the
matching is mainly based on the method of representation, i.e., the method used for encoding the
iris texture. Thus, most existing techniques for iris recognition can be divided into two major
classes. The first class represents the iris texture using filters or transforms [66], The second class
of methods seeks to capture local and macro iris feature suchas freckles, crypts, furrows, etc. in
the spatial domain [67][68].
Daugman’s phase encoding technique, which come under the first class, is the most common
and promising among the different iris recognition approaches [64] [65] [69]. Figure 2.7 shows
the processing chain of the traditional iris recognition system following Daugman’s approach
[70]. First, a camera acquires an image of an eye and the iris annul r region is segmented, Next,
the annular iris is geometrically normalized,i.e., unwrapped from raw image coordinates to polar
coordinates. A texture filter is applied to the normalized iris image, and the filter responses are
quantized into a binary representation (i.e., iris code). The comparison between two iris codes is
done by computing the fractional HD as a dissimilarity measure.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, we gave a brief introduction to three biometric traits, fingerprint, face and
iris, which will be utilized in this thesis to generate jointdentities. We discussed the different
representation and matching schemes for these biometric traits. Recent research has resulted in
the development of robust matchers for these modalities. Further, new cryptographic constructs
have been proposed for these modalities [71]. For a more detailed description, the reader is
referred to [14].
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In this dissertation, the proposed concept of generating joi t identities by mixing biometrics
of different individuals is introduced. Biometric images of different individuals are fused at the
image level to generate a new biometric image. Image level fusion has been previously used in the
context of fingerprints to combine multiple impressions of the same finger [35]. In this chapter,
unlike previous work (see Section 1.4.2), two fingerprint impressions acquired from twodifferent
fingers are fused into a new fingerprint image resulting in a new identity∗. The mixed image
incorporates characteristics from both the original fingerprint images, and can be used directly in
the feature extraction and matching stages of an existing biometric system. In the following, the
major motivations behind the development of the proposed approach are discussed.
• The proposed approach explores the possibility of fusing images from distinct fingers at the
image level and determining how this will affect authentication performance. For example,
the proposed approach could be used to mix the prints of the thumb and the index fingers
of a single individual, or index fingers of two different individuals, and generate a new
fingerprint. Therefore, the concept of mixing fingerprints could be utilized in a multi-finger
authentication system. This has benefits in terms of storageand security.
• Fingerprint mixing can be used to generate a large set of virtual identities. These virtual
identities can be used to conceal the original identities ofsubjects or be used for large-scale
∗Here, the term “identity” is used to suggest that the mixed fingerprint is unique and possibly different from other
fingerprints.
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evaluation of algorithms [72][35].
• De-identifying a fingerprint image is necessary to mitigateconcerns related to biometric
data sharing and data misuse [19][29][30]. Fingerprint mixing can be used to de-identify an
input fingerprint image by fusing it with another fingerprint(e.g., from a different finger) at
image level, in order to produce a new mixed image that obscure the identity of the original
fingerprint. In [73] and [24] a similar approach has been proposed to preserve the privacy
of fingerprints by fusing two distinct fingers but only at the feature level. Our proposed
approach creates a new image that looks like a plausible fingerprint image and, thus, (a) it
can be processed by conventional fingerprint algorithms and(b) an intruder cannot easily
determine if a given print is mixed or not.
The mixing process begins by decomposing each fingerprint image into two different com-
ponents, viz., the continuous and spiral components (see Figure 3.1). The continuous
component defines the local ridge orientation, and the spiral component characterizes the
minutiae locations. Next, the two components of each fingerprint are aligned to a com-
mon coordinate system. Finally, the continuous component of one fingerprint is combined
with the spiral component of the other fingerprint. This workconfirmed that (a) the new
fingerprint representing a new identity can potentially be us d for authentication; (b) the
proposed method can be utilized to generate different-sized databases of virtual identities
from a fixed fingerprint dataset; (c) it can be used to obscure the information present in
an individual’s fingerprint image prior to storing it in a central database; and (d) it can be
used to generate a cancelable template, i.e., the template can be reset if the mixed finger-
print is compromised. Since the proposed approach can be used for de-identifying finger-
prints, in this chapter, a detailed analysis of the securityaspects, i.e., the changeability and
non-invertability properties of the mixing fingerprint approach has been included. This se-
curity analysis is based on metrics commonly used in the cancel ble biometrics literature
[27][28]. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the proposed
approach for mixing fingerprints. Section 3.3 reports the experimental results and Section
3.4 summarizes the chapter.
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Figure 3.1: Proposed approach for mixing fingerprints
3.2 Mixing Fingerprints: The proposed approach
The ridge flow of a fingerprint can be represented as a 2D Amplitude and Frequency Mod-
ulated (AM-FM) signal [74]:
I(x, y) = a(x, y) + b(x, y)cos(Ψ(x, y)) + n(x, y), (3.1)
whereI(x, y) is the intensity of the original image at(x, y), a(x, y) is the intensity off-
set,b(x, y) is the amplitude,Ψ(x, y) is the phase andn(x, y) is the noise. Based on the
Helmholtz Decomposition Theorem [75], the phase can be uniquely decomposed into the
continuous phase and the spiral phase,Ψ(x, y) = ψc(x, y) + ψs(x, y). As shown in Figure
3.2, the cosine of the continuous phase, i.e., the continuous c mponentcos(ψc(x, y)), de-
fines the local ridge orientation, and the cosine of the spiral h se, i.e., the spiral component
cos(ψs(x, y)), characterizes the minutiae locations. Letφ(x, y) denote the spiral phase of a
local region in a fingerprint. Assume that the functionφ(x, y) monotonically changes from
0 to 2π around a particular point,(xn, yn), and has a characteristic jump from0 to 2π at the
point (xn, yn). This forms a residue at(xn, yn) with an associated polarity,pn ∈ {−1, 1}.
A residue with positive (negative) polarity is referred to as a positive (negative) spiral.
φ(x, y) = pn tan
−1((x− xn)/(y − yn)). (3.2)
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(a)
(b) (c)
Figure 3.2: Decomposing a fingerprint. (a) A fingerprint image. (b) Continuous component,
cos(ψc(x, y)). (c) Spiral component,cos(ψs(x, y)). The blue and pink dots represent ridge end-
ings and ridge bifurcations, respectively.
Appending this function to the continuous phase will cause aphase jump at(xn, yn) result-
ing in a minutia. In Figure 3.3, a local ridge pattern is generat d based on the continuous
phase function2πfy, with f = 4. Depending upon the polarity value (+1 or -1), a minutia
is generated on the ridge pattern. The relation between the polarity, pn, and the occurrence
of ridge ending or bifurcation is dependent on the gradient direction of the cosine of the
continuous phase. Hence, the spiral phase allows for an abrupt change in the local fringe
density by either inserting or deleting a ridge based on the polarity and the appending lo-
cation within the continuous phase. If the simple function in (3.2) is replaced by a sum of






−1((x− xn)/(y − yn)), (3.3)
wherexn andyn denote the coordinates of thenth minutia, andN denotes the total number
of minutiae. Moreover, the type of a minutia (ending or bifurcation) is determined by its
polarity pn ∈ {−1, 1}. Thus, based on this 2D AM-FM representation, the fingerprint’s
oriented patterns can be uniquely decomposed into (a) a small number of topologically
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(a)
(b) pn = +1 (c)pn = -1 (d)pn = +1 (e)pn = -1
Figure 3.3: Generating minutia in a fringe pattern. (a) Grayscale image of continuous phase
given bycos(2πfy). (b) and(c) Appending a minutia at “B”. (d) and (e) Appendinga minutia at
“E”.
distinct discontinuities, i.e., the spiral phase, and (b) awell defined smooth flow field, i.e.,
the continuous phase.
3.2.1 Fingerprint Decomposition
Decomposing images into semantic parts is of great interestin many applications such as
compression, enhancement, restoration, and more. Therefor , this task has drawn a lot
of research attention and most of the proposed approaches are utilizing total variational
calculus. These methods are inspired by the total variation(TV) regularization for image
denoising and restoration [76]. The separation is done by decomposing the image into
texture and non-texture (or cartoon) components, as shown in Figure 3.4. So this kind of
image decomposition can be useful for image compression where compressing the cartoon
and the texture components separately can provide better results, image denoising where
zero mean oscillatory noise can be regarded as a fine texture,image feature selection, etc.
But these methods are suggested for textures with no prior knowledge about it, meanwhile,
in order to decompose a biometric image into its component structures, understanding the
non-linear nature of the image and the source of its distinctiveness and individuality will
be beneficial.
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(a)
(b) (c)
Figure 3.4: Cartoon-texture decomposition using a total variation method [6]. (a) A fingerprint
image. (b) Cartoon image. (c) Texture image.
Therefore, we found that the Larkin et al.’s hologram model [77] (check Equation 3.1),
i.e., a phase modulated fringe pattern to represent the fingerprint images can be the suitable
method to decompose fingerprint images. Larkin et al.’s work[77][74] is the culmination
of several years of investigating mathematical methods fordemodulation of optical inter-
ferograms that have fringe pattern such as fingerprint images.
The hologram representation of fingerprint is an adaptive and data-driven approach in com-
parison to traditional representation such as the Fourier owavelet methods where a pre-
defined decomposition basis is used. Moreover, the frequency r presentation fails to work
properly because there is an infinite singularity at each minutiae point. On the other hand,
the hologram phase circumvents the infinite frequency singularities that always occur at
minutiae in the phase estimation step.
Since ridges and minutiae can be completely determined by the phase [74]Ψ(x, y). The
other three parameters in Equation (3.1) contribute to the realistic textural appearance of
the fingerprint. Before fingerprint decomposition, the phaseΨ(x, y) must be reliably esti-
mated; this is termed as demodulation.
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Vortex demodulation
The objective of vortex demodulation [77] is to extract the amplitudeb(x, y) and phase
Ψ(x, y) of the fingerprint pattern. First, the DC terma(x, y) has to be removed since the
failure to remove this offset correctly may introduce significant errors in the demodulated
amplitude and phase [77]. To facilitate this, a normalized fingerprint image,f(x, y), con-
taining the enhanced ridge pattern of the fingerprint (generated by the VeriFinger SDK†) is
used. From Equation (3.1),f(x, y) = I(x, y)− a(x, y) ≃ b(x, y)cos(Ψ(x, y)). The vortex
demodulation operatorV takes the normalized imagef(x, y) and applies a spiral phase
Fourier multiplierexp[iΦ(u, v)]:
V{f(x, y)} = F−1{exp[iΦ(u, v)].F{b(x, y). cos[Ψ(x, y)]}}
∼= −i exp[iβ(x, y)].b(x, y). sin[Ψ(x, y)]
(3.4)
where,F is the Fourier transform,F−1 is the inverse Fourier transform andexp[iΦ(u, v)] is






Note that in Equation (3.4) there is a new parameter,β(x y), representing the perpendicular
direction of the ridges. In Equation (3.6), this directional map is used to isolate the desired
magnitude and phase from Equation (3.4), i.e.,
− exp[−iβ(x, y)].V{f(x, y)} = ib(x, y). sin[Ψ(x, y)]. (3.6)
Then, Equation (3.6) can be combined with the normalized image,f(x, y), to obtain the
magnitudeb(x, y) and the raw phase mapΨ(x, y) as follows:
− exp[−iβ(x, y)].V{f(x, y)}+ f(x, y) = b(x, y). exp(iΨ(x, y)). (3.7)
Therefore, determiningβ(x, y) is essential for obtaining the amplitude and phase func-
tions, b(x, y) andΨ(x, y), respectively. The direction mapβ(x, y) can be derived from
the orientation image of the fingerprint by a process called unwrapping. A sophisticated
†http://www.neurotechnology.com
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unwrapping technique using the topological properties of the ridge flow fields is necessary
to account for direction singularities such as cores and deltas [74] [23].
Direction Map β(x, y)
Direction is uniquely defined in the range 0◦ to 360◦ (modulo 2π). In contrast, finger-
print ridge orientation is indistinguishable from that of a180◦ rotated ridge (moduloπ).
Therefore, the fingerprint’sorientationmap, denoted byθ(x, y), should be unwrapped to a
directionmap,β(x, y) [74]. Phase unwrapping is a technique used to address a2π phase
jump in the orientation map. The unwrapping process adds or subt acts an offset of2π to
successive pixels whenever a phase jump is detected [75]. This process proceeds by start-
ing at any pixel within the orientation image and using the loca orientation information to
traverse the image pixel-by-pixel, and assigning a direction (i.e., the traversed direction) to
each pixel with the condition that there are no discontinuites of2π between neighboring
pixels. However, the presence of flow singularities means that there will be pixels in the
orientation image with a discontinuity of±2π in the traversed direction and, therefore, the
above unwrapping technique will fail. In fingerprint images, such flow singularities arise
from the presence of singular points such as core and delta. Figure 3.5(a) illustrates that es-
timating the direction of ridges in the vicinity of a core point by starting at any point within
the highlighted rectangle and arbitrarily assigning one oftw possible directions, can result
in an inconsistency in the estimated directions inside the dashed circle. This inconsistency
in the estimated direction map can be avoided by using a branch cut [75]. The branch cut
is a line or a curve used to isolate the flow singularity and which cannot be crossed by
the paths of the unwrapping process. Consequently, branch cut prevents the creation of2π
discontinuities and restores the path independence of the unwrapping process. As shown
in Figure 3.5(b), tracing a line down from the core point and using this line as a barrier
resolves the inconsistency near the core point (i.e, insidethe dashed circle) by selecting
two different directions in each side of the branch cut within the same region (i.e, inside
the highlighted rectangle). In our work, a strategy based onthe techniques described in
[74] [7] [23] has been adapted to estimate the direction mapβ(x, y), which is summarized
in the following three steps.
1. The orientation imageθ(x, y) of the normalized fingerprintf(x, y) is determined via the
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.5: A portion of the estimated direction map (a) befor assigning a branch cut and (b)
after assigning a branch cut [7].
least mean-square method [78]. Then the Poincaré [35] index is used to locate the singular
points, if any.
2. In case there are singular points, an algorithm is appliedto extract the branch cuts
along suitable paths such as ridge contours, as shown in Figure 3.5(b), to resolve the in-
evitable direction ambiguities near those singularities.The branch cuts are extracted by
tracing the contours of ridges (rather than the orientationfield) in the skeleton images. The
algorithm starts from each singular point in a skeleton image until the trace reaches the
border of the segmented foreground region of the fingerprinto when it encounters another
singular point. To generate the skeleton images, first, a setof smoothed orientation maps
are generated by applying a Gaussian smoothing operation atdifferent smoothing scales
(σ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 15, 20, 32, 50, 64}) on θ(x, y). Next, a set of Gabor filters, tuned to the
smoothed orientation maps [78], is convolved with the normalized imagef(x, y). Then,
a local adaptive thresholding and thinning algorithm [79] is applied to the directionally
filtered images producing 10 skeleton images. Thus, there arat least 10 branch cuts and
the shortest one, associated with each singular point, is selected and Figure 3.6 shows two
examples of skeleton images and the corresponding branch cuts of a core point. Figure 3.7
shows examples of the branch cuts extracted from the singular points of different finger-
prints.
3. The phase unwrapping algorithm [80] [75] starts from any arbitrary pixel in the orienta-
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tion mapθ(x, y) and visits the other pixels, which are unwrapped in the same manner as in
images without singularity, with the exception here that the branch cuts cannot be crossed.
Then, each branch cut is visited individually and its pixelsare traced and unwrapped.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3.6: Examples of skeleton images and branch cuts for asingular point where (a) and (c) are
skeleton images generated withσ = 3 and 32, respectively and (b) and (d) are the corresponding
branch cuts. Branch cut in (d) is the selected one.
Finally, the direction mapβ(x, y) is determined from the unwrappedθ(x, y) by addingπ/2
which allows for the determination of the amplitudeb(x, y) and phaseΨ(x, y) modulations
of fingerprint image from Equation (3.7). A flowchart for demodulating a fingerprint image
is depicted in Figure 3.8.





Figure 3.7: Examples of fingerprints with singular points (The blue dots and red triangle represent
cores and delta, respectively). (a), (c), (e), and (g) The normalized fingerprints. (b), (d), (f), and
(h) The extracted branch cuts obtained by tracing the ridgesinstead of the orientation field.
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Figure 3.8: Flowchart for demodulating a fingerprint image.
Helmholtz Decomposition
The Helmholtz Decomposition Theorem [75] is used to decompose the determined phase
Ψ(x, y) of a fingerprint image into two phases. The first phase,ψc is a continuous one,
which can be unwrapped, and the second is a spiral phase,ψs, which cannot be unwrapped
but can be defined as a phase that exhibits spiral behavior at aset of discrete points in the
image. The Bone’s residue detector [81] [75] is first used to determine the spiral phase
ψs(x, y) from the demodulated phaseΨ(x, y). Next the continuous phase, is computed
asψc(x, y) = Ψ(x, y) − ψs(x, y). Finally, although subtracting the spiral phase from the
phase should results in a continuous phase with no discontinuities, due to the inevitable
quantization errors in the subtracting operation, it is essential to unwrap the continuous
phase again by using the branch cuts from the previous step. Figure 3.9 illustrates the steps
to determine the continuous componentcos(ψc(x, y)) (Figure 3.9(h)) from the estimated
spiral componentcos(ψs(x, y)) (Figure 3.9(f)) of a fingerprint and the demodulated phase
Ψ(x, y) (Figure 3.9(a)).
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Figure 3.9: Determining fingerprint constituents from (a) the demodulated phaseΨ(x, y). (b)
Spiral Phaseψs(x, y). (c) Continuous Phaseψc(x, y). (d) Unwrapped continuous Phase. (e), (f),
(g) and (h) are the cosine (according to the hologram modal repres ntation of fringe pattern, as
explained in Equation 3.1) of (a), (b), (c) and (d), respectiv ly.
3.2.2 Fingerprint Pre-alignment
To mix two different fingerprints after decomposing each fingerprint into its continuous
componentcos(ψc(x, y)) and spiral componentcos(ψs(x, y)), the fingerprints themselves
should be appropriately aligned. Previous research has shown that two fingerprints can
be best aligned using their minutiae correspondences. However, it is difficult to ensure
the existence of such correspondences between two fingerprints acquired from different
fingers. In this work, the components are pre-aligned to a comm n coordinate system prior
to the mixing step by utilizing a reference point and an alignme t line. The reference point
is used to center the components. The alignment line is used to find a rotation angle about
the reference point. This angle rotates the alignment line to make it vertical. The two phase
components of each fingerprint are rotated by the same angle.
Locating a reference point
The reference point used in this work is the northern most core p int of extracted singu-
larities. For plain arch fingerprints or partial fingerprintimages, Novikov et al.’s technique
[82] [21], based on the Hough transform, is used to detect thereference point.
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Finding the alignment line
The first step in finding the alignment line is to extract high curvature points from the skele-
ton of the fingerprint image’s continuous component. Next, horizontal distances between
the reference point and all high curvature points are calculted. Then, based on these dis-
tances, an adaptive threshold is applied to select and cluster points near the reference point.
Finally, a line is fitted through the selected points to generate the alignment line. Figure
3.10 shows the steps to find the reference point and the alignment line by utilizing the
continuous phase component of an arch fingerprint. Since thecontinuous component of a
fingerprint is a global feature of the fingerprint pattern andis not affected by breaks and
discontinuities which are commonly encountered in ridge extraction, the determined refer-
ence point and alignment line are consistence and do not reveal any information about the
minutia attributes which are local characteristics in the fingerprint.
Figure 3.10: Finding the reference point and alignment linefor an arch fingerprint.
3.2.3 Mixing Fingerprints
Let F1 andF2 be two different fingerprint images from different fingers, and letψci(x, y)
andψsi(x, y) be the pre-aligned continuous and spiral phases,i = 1, 2. As shown in Figure
3.1, there are two different mixed fingerprint image that canbe generated,MF1 andMF2:
MF1 = cos(ψc2 + ψs1),
MF2 = cos(ψc1 + ψs2).
(3.8)
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The continuous phase ofF2 (F1) is combined with the spiral phase ofF1 (F2) which gen-
erates a new fused fingerprint imageMF1 (MF2).
3.2.4 Compatibility Measure
Variations in the orientations and frequencies of ridges betwe n fingerprint images can re-
sult in visually unrealistic mixed fingerprint images, as shown in Figure 3.11. This issue
can be mitigated if the two fingerprints to be mixed are carefully chosen using a compati-
bility measure. In this work, the compatibility between fingerprints is computed using non-
minutiae features, viz., orientation fields and frequency maps of fingerprint ridges. Figure
Figure 3.11: Examples of mixed fingerprints that look unrealistic.
(a) Fingerprint Image
(b) Orientation Field (c) Frequency Map
Figure 3.12: Orientations and frequencies of the ridges of afingerprint image.
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3.12 shows the orientation and frequency images were computed from the pre-aligned con-
tinuous component of a fingerprint using the technique described in [78]. Then, Yager and
Amin’s [83] approach is used to compute the compatibility measure. To compute the com-
patibility between two fingerprint images, their orientation fields and frequency maps are
first estimated (see below). Then, the compatibility measureC between them is computed
as the weighted sum of the normalized orientations and frequency differences,OD and
FD, respectively:
C = 1− (α.OD + γ.FD), (3.9)
whereα andγ are weights that are determined empirically. Figure 3.13 show examples
of mixed fingerprints after utilizing the compatibility measure to select the fingerprints
pairs, (F1, F2). Perfect compatibility (C = 1) is likely to occur when the two prints to be
mixed are from the same or the look-alike finger - a scenario that isnot applicable in the
proposed application. On the other hand, two fingerprints having significantly different
ridge structures are unlikely to be compatible (C = 0) and will generate an unrealistic
looking fingerprint. Between these two extremes (see Figure3.14), lies a range of possible
compatible values that is acceptable. However, determining this range automatically may
be difficult.
Figure 3.13: Examples of mixed fingerprints that appear to bevisually realistic.
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Figure 3.14: Examples of a fingerprint image and its compatibility measure with other images.
Orientation Field Difference (OD)








d(θ1(x, y), θ2(x, y)), (3.10)
whereS is a set of coordinates within the overlapped area of the aligned continuous com-
ponents of two different fingerprints, andθ1 andθ2 represent the orientation fields of the
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Frequency Map Difference (FD)
Local ridge frequencies are the inverse of the average distance between ridges in the local
area in a direction perpendicular to the local orientation.Hong et al.’s approach [78] is used
to find the local ridge frequencies of the continuous component of a fingerprint image. The
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|Freq1(x, y)− Freq2(x, y)|, (3.12)
whereS is a set of coordinates within the overlapped area, andFreq1 andFreq2 represent
the frequency maps of the two fingerprintsF1 andF2, respectively.
3.3 Experiments and Discussion
The performance of the proposed fingerprints mixing approach was tested using two dif-
ferent datasets. The first dataset was taken from the West Virginia University (WVU)
multimodal biometric database [84]. A subset of 1000 imagescorresponding to 500 fin-
gers (two impressions per finger) was used. The second dataset w the FVC2002 DB2
fingerprint database containing 110 fingers with 8 impressions per finger (a total of 880
fingerprints). The VeriFinger SDK was used to generate the normalized fingerprint images
and the matching scores. Also, an open source Matlab implementation [85] based on Hong
et al.’s approach [78] was used to compute the orientation and frequency images of the
fingerprints. In order to establish the baseline performance, for each finger in each dataset,
an impression was used as a probe image and another impression was added to the gallery.
This resulted in a rank-1 accuracy of∼ 100% for the WVU dataset and∼ 100% for the
FVC2002 dataset. The EERs for these two datasets were 0.5% and 0.2%, respectively. In
the following subsections, two set of experiments are discus ed. These experiments in-
vestigate if the new approach for image level fusion can be utilized to (a) generate a new
identity by mixing two distinct fingerprints and (b) de-identify a fingerprint by mixing it
with another fingerprint. Although they have some common experiment routines, the used
dataset and the objectives are different.
Computational time We evaluated the time complexity of the approach usingMatlab R©-
2013a on a PC withIntel R© i7 CPU @2.8GHz and 8GB memory. As shown in Figure 3.1,
there are three main steps for mixing fingerprints: Decomposition, Alignment, and Mixing.
Table 3.1 shows the elapsed time of each step.
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3.3.1 Generating Joint Identities
The purpose of the following set of experiments was to reportthe matching performance
of mixing images of two different fingers pertaining to two different individuals from the
WVU dataset to generate joint identities.Therefore, the following experiments were de-
signed in order to address the following questions:
1. What impact does mixing fingerprints have on the matching performance, i.e., can two
mixed impressions pertaining to the same new identity be successfully matched?
2. Are the original fingerprints and the mixed fingerprint correlated? It is essential to assure
that the proposed approach generates a new fingerprint that is dissimilar from the original
fingerprints
3. How many virtual identities can be generated from a fixed fingerprint dataset with an
acceptable recognition rate?
For each finger in the WVU dataset, one impression was used as the probe image and the
other was added to the gallery resulting in a probe setP and a gallery setG each containing
150 fingerprints.
– Experiment A-1: In this experiment, the performance of generating new identti s
by mixing random pairs of fingers is reported. Pairs of fingerprints in P were ran-
domlypaired and mixed resulting in a new probe setMF P1 consisting of 250 finger-
prints. The corresponding pairs of fingerprints inG were also mixed resulting in a
new gallery setMFG1 consisting of 250 impressions. Since, mixing is an asymmet-
ric process (Equation (3.8)), another probe setMF P2 and gallery setMF
G
2 were also







resulted in a rank-1 accuracy of∼ 68% and an EER of∼ 15%. The low identifi-
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cation rate is due to the random pairing of fingers which lead to visually unrealistic
fingerprint images (see Figure 3.11).
– Experiment A-2: The purpose of this experiment is to enhance the identification rate
of Experiment A-1 by mixing fingers based on the compatibility measure. Therefore,
the compatibility measures between different pairs of fingerprints inP were computed
using Equation (3.9) withα = 0.7 andγ = 0.3. The finger pairs to be mixed were
selected based on this measure. Pairs were selected and mixein d creasing order
of their compatibility measures resulting in probe setsMF P1 andMF
P
2 , and gallery
setsMFG1 andMF
G
2 . Figure 3.15 shows examples of the mixed fingerprints from the
WVU dataset. Matching images inMF P1 against those inMF
G
1 and images inMF
P
2
against those inMFG2 resulted in a rank-1 accuracy of∼ 85% and an EER of∼ 6%.
As shown in Figures 3.11, 3.13, and??, the compatibility measure assists the mixing
approach in generating visually appealing mixed fingerprints with less false minutia
in the overlapping area.
– Experiment A-3: It is essential to assure that the new identities are dissimilar from
the original fingers. Therefore, in this experiment,MF P1 andMF
P
2 , generated in Ex-
periment A-2, are matched againstF P1 andF
P
2 in P (as in Experiment A-2,F
P
1 and





are the resulting mixed fingerprints).






2 ) resulted in rank-1 accuracy of∼ 52%
and EER of∼ 25%.






1 ) resulted in rank-1 accuracy of∼ 38%
and EER of∼ 46%.
The poor matching performance indicates that the original figerprints are different
from newly generated mixed fingerprints. In other words, theoriginal identity can-
not be easily deduced from the mixed image and the new mixed fingerprint may be
viewed as a cancelable fingerprint. However, in matching scenario “a”, the reduction





2 ) have the same minutia locations as shown in Figure 3.1 and Equation
(3.8). This commonality of minutia locations leads to high similarity scores between
original and virtual identities. Ridge features, e.g., ridge length and ridge curvature,
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Figure 3.15: Examples of mixing fingerprint pairs from the WVU dataset.
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can be used along with conventional minutia features to address the commonality of







– Experiment A-4: In this experiment, the possibility of utilizing the proposed ap-
proach to mix the prints from the two fingers of a subject to create a single new fin-
gerprint is investigated. The new identity is a result of fusing images of the thumb and
the index fingers of a single individual. For this experiment, the data corresponding
to both the left thumb and left index finger of 150 subjects from the WVU database
were used. There were two impressions available for each finger. Each left thumb
impression was mixed with the corresponding left index finger resulting in two mixed
fingerprint impressions for each subject. One of these mixedimpressions was used as
a probe and the other was added to the gallery set. The obtained ra k-1 accuracy was
∼ 81% and the EER was∼ 9% suggesting the possibility of designing a new multi-
finger authentication scheme for access control. Here, onlythe mixed impression
needs to be stored in the database (as opposed to images of individual fingers).
– Experiment A-5: Mixing fingerprints generates new fused fingerprints, i.e.,new
identities. Therefore, in this experiment, we investigated the possibility of gener-
ating different-sized databases of virtual identities. Mixing all possible pairs from





= 11, 175 different virtual
identities pairs. In this experiment, fingerprints pairs inthe probe set are sorted based
on the compatibility metric values. Then, theN fingerprint pairs with highest com-
patibility values inP were mixed and so were their corresponding impressions in the
gallery set (G). Table 3.2 reports the rank-1, rank-5 accuracies and the EERs of the
virtual identity datasets created with different values ofN . These results confirm the
possibility of generating virtual identities by mixing fingerprints; however, there is
a trade-off between database size and the identification accur y‡. This trade-off is
because mixing several pairs from the same probe setP can lead to the generation
of several identities sharing a common fingerprint (F1). Assume two fingerprint pairs
(Fa, Fb) and (Fa, Fc) whereFb 6= Fc. Combining the spiral component,cos(ψs), of
the common fingerprint (Fa), with the continuous components,cos(ψc), of Fb andFc
generates two mixed fingerprintsMFab andMFac, respectively.MFab andMFac are
‡Generating and matching all the 11,175 virtual identities resulted in an EER of 17%
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likely to share some common minutiae locations. This leads to high impostor match-
ing scores between two different virtual identities, consequently resulting in high false
acceptance rate and low identification accuracy.
Table 3.2: The Rank-1, -5 accuracies and EER of the virtual ident ty databases
Size of the database (N) Rank-1 (%) Rank-5 (%) EER (%)
50 88 95 4
100 85 97 5
200 84 95 5
800 68 82 8
1000 56 81 10
3.3.2 Generating Cancelable Identities
De-identifying fingerprint image is necessary to mitigate concerns related to data sharing
and data misuse [19] and this is possible by transforming fingerprint image into a new one
using a set of application-specific transformation functions, such that the original identity
cannot be easily deduced from the transformed. A fingerprintthat is transformed in this
way is referred to as a cancelable fingerprint since it can be “canceled” by merely changing
the transformation function [29] [30]. The purpose of the following experiments was to
investigate if the proposed approach can be used to obscure the information present in
a component fingerprint image by generating a cancelable template prior to storing it in
a central database. Therefore, fingerprints from FVC 2002-DB were de-identified by
mixing them with fingerprints from the WVU dataset.
With regards to mixing fingerprints for de-identification, the following key issues are raised
[86][87][88][27][89][28]:
1. Performance: What impact does mixing fingerprints have onthe matching performance,
i.e., can two mixed impressions pertaining to the same identity be successfully matched?
(see Experiment B-1)
2. Changeability: Are the original fingerprint and the mixedfingerprint correlated? It is
essential to assure that the proposed approach prevents ideity linking, by preventing the
possibility of successfully matching the original print with the mixed print (see Experiment
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B-2).
3. Non-invertibility: Can an adversary create a physical spoof of the original fingerprint
from a compromised mixed fingerprint? It must be computationlly infeasible to obtain the
original fingerprint features, i.e., the locations and orientations of fingerprint minutia from
the mixed fingerprint (see Experiment B-3).
4. Cancelability: Does mixing result in cancelable templates? In case a stored fingerprint
is compromised, a new mixed fingerprint can be generated by mixing the original with a
new fingerprint. The new mixed fingerprint and the compromised mixed image must be
sufficiently different, even though they are derived from the same finger. Another way of
looking at this is as follows: if two different fingerprints,F1 andF2, are mixed with the
same fingerprintFm, are the resulting mixed fingerprints,M1 andM2, similar? From the
perspective of security, they shouldnotbe similar (see Experiments B-4 and B-5).
Therefore, the following experiments were designed to evaluate the security strength and
the usability of our proposed approach for generating cancel ble fingerprints.
– Experiment B-1: The purpose of this experiment was to report the matching per-
formance of de-identifying fingerprints from FVC 2002-DB2 by mixing them with
fingerprints from the WVU dataset. For each fingerprint in FVC2002-DB2 noted by
F1, its compatibility measure with each fingerprint in the WVU dataset (300 images
of 150 subjects) was computed using Equation (3.9) withα = 0.6 andγ = 0.4. Based
on the computed compatibility measures, the spiral component of F1 was combined
with the continuous component of the most compatible fingerprint imageF2 in the
WVU dataset, resulting in the mixed fingerprintMF1. Figure 3.16 shows examples
of mixed fingerprints. Because there are 2 impressions per finger i FVC2002-DB2,
the mixing process resulted in 2 impressions per mixed finger. one of these mixed
impressions was used as probe images and the other was added to the gallery set.
The obtained rank-1 accuracy was∼ 83% and the EER was∼ 7%. This indicates
the possibility of matching mixed fingerprints. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show the recog-
nition performance of mixing fingerprint along with different cancelable techniques
and cryptosystems schemes, respectively. These approaches hav been reported be-
cause they stated their experimental results of protectingthe fingerprint templates of
FVC2002-DB2.
Asem A. Othman Chapter 3. Mixing Fingerprints 50
Note that the template protection schemes such as biotokens[90] and the cryptosys-
tems schemes [91] [92] are verification systems which combine ometric informa-
tion with another assigned secret. Therefore, these schemes hav better performance
because the user is required to carry (e.g., a token) or remember (e.g., a password)
another authenticator in addition to his biometrics.
Table 3.3: Recognition performance of mixing fingerprints and other cancelable biometrics
approaches
Cacelable biometrics techniques EER(%)




Table 3.4: Recognition performance of mixing fingerprints and cryptosystems schemes
Cryptosystems schemesFRR@FAR ≃ 0.01%(%)
Fuzzy Vault [91] 5
Fuzzy Commitment [92] 12.6
Mixing Fingerprints 14
– Experiment B-2: In this experiment, the possibility of exposing the identity of the
FVC2002-DB2 fingerprint image by using the mixed fingerprintimages was investi-
gated. The mixed fingerprintsMF1 (2 impressions per finger) were matched against
the original images in FVC2002-DB2. The resultant rank-1 accuracy was less than
30% (and the EER was more than 30%) suggesting that the original identity cannot
be easily deduced from the mixed image.
– Experiment B-3: In this experiment, the vulnerability of the proposed de-idntification
approach to brute-force attacks is discussed with respect to non-invertibility [87] if an
attacker were to access the mixed fingerprintMF1. In other words, if the mixed fin-
gerprintMF1 was compromised, the probability of successfully reconstructing the
original fingerprintF1 is estimated. Based on Equation (3.8), if an attacker accesses
a mixed fingerprintMF1 (with the knowledge that it is a mixed fingerprint) andF2,
and then decomposesMF1 by using the technique described in sub-section 3.2.1,
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Figure 3.16: Examples of mixing fingerprints whereF1 andF2 are fingerprints from the FVC2000
and WVU datasets, respectively.
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the minutia locations of the original fingerprintF1, characterized by the spiral com-
ponent, are compromised. Although several researchers have shown that the origi-
nal fingerprint image can be reconstructed from a fingerprint’s minutiae consisting of
their locationsandorientations [22][21][23], there is no published work thatdiscusses
the possibility to reconstruct the original fingerprint image only from the minutiae lo-
cations. Therefore, the attacker must assume the orientatio of each minutia to be
able to reconstruct the original fingerprint. Hence, ifx is the tolerance determining
the acceptable deviation from the original orientation, the probability of assuming the





Consequently, the probability of successfully generatingn or more minutiae which










whereN is the total number of minutiae in a fingerprint, andis the minimum num-
ber of minutiae required for authentication. Table 3.5 shows the probabilities of suc-
cessfully compromising the orientations of minutiae points the original fingerprints
for different values ofn. In our experiments, the average number of minutiae per fin-
gerprint,N , is 45. The low probabilities in the table indicate that it isd fficult to
regenerate the original fingerprint from the mixed fingerprint.
Table 3.5: The probabilityP of generatingn or more minutiae which are the same as in the






– Experiment B-4: The purpose of this experiment was to investigate if the proposed
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approach can be used to cancel a compromised mixed fingerprint and generate a new
mixed fingerprint by mixing the original fingerprint with a new fingerprint. To eval-
uate this, the 2 impressions of one single fingerprint in the FVC2002-DB2 database
were selected. Next, this fingerprint was mixed with each of the 500 fingers in the
WVU dataset. This resulted in 500 mixed fingerprints with 2 impressions per finger.
One of these impressions per mixed finger was used as a probe imag and the other
was added to the gallery set. Then, each image in the probe setwa compared against
all images in the gallery set in order to determine a match. A match is deemed to
be correct (i.e., the probe is correctly identified) if the probe image and the matched
gallery image are from the same mixed finger. In the resultingexperiments, the rank-
1 identification accuracy obtained was 85% and the EER was 7%.The reasonably
high identification rate suggests that the 500 mixed fingerprints are different from
each other. This means, the fingerprint from the FVC2002-DB2database can be suc-
cessfully “canceled” and converted into a new “identity” based on the choice of the
fingerprint selected from the WVU database for mixing.
– Experiment B-5: In this experiment, two different fingerprints from FVC2002-DB2,
F1 andF2 (i.e., a single print of two different fingers from two different identities),
were mixed with each of the 500 different fingers in the WVU dataset. This resulted in
two set of mixed fingerprints - one based onF1 and the other based onF2. Matching
these two sets against each other resulted in a rank-1 accuracy of 5% and an EER of
45%. This suggests that two different fingerprints mixed with a common fingerprint
cannot be easily matched against each other. This further confirms the cancelable
aspect of the proposed approach.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, the concept of fusing biometrics signals, i.e. mixing biometrics was used in
the context of fingerprint images. Fingerprint images are mixed in order to generate joint
identities. Mixing fingerprints refers to the process of generating a new fingerprint image
by fusing fingerprints of two different fingers pertaining toa single individual or different
















Table 3.6: The Rank-1 accuracies and EERs of the experiments










A-1 Generating 250 identities 68 15 Low EER
(randomly paired) High Rank-1 acc.
A-2 Generating 250 identities 85 6 Low EER
(paired based on the compatibility measure) High Rank-1 acc.







2 )) Low Rank-1 acc.
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B-1 De-identifying FVC 2002-DB2 fingerprints 83 7 Low EER
High Rank-1 acc.
B-2 Mixed vs original 30 30 High EER
Low Rank-1 acc.
B-4 Mixed vs mixed 85 7 Low EER
(sameF1 and differentF2) High Rank-1 acc.
B-5 Mixed vs mixed 5 45 High EER
(differentF1 and sameF2) Low Rank-1 acc.
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ages, and can be used directly in the feature extraction and mtching stages of an existing
fingerprint recognition system. Also, it was demonstrated that “mixing fingerprints” can
be utilized to (a) generate a new identity by mixing two distinc fingerprints and (b) de-
identify a fingerprint by mixing it with another fingerprint.To mix two fingerprints, each
fingerprint is decomposed into two components, viz., the continuous and spiral compo-
nents. After aligning the components of each fingerprint, the continuous component of one
fingerprint is combined with the spiral component of the other fingerprint image. Experi-
ments on two fingerprint databases, that has been summarizedin Table 3.6, show that (a)
the mixed fingerprint representing a new identity can potentially be used for authentication,
(b) the mixed fingerprint is dissimilar from the original fingerprints used to generate it, (c)
the same fingerprint can be used in various applications and cross-matching between appli-
cations can be prevented by mixing the original fingerprint with a different fingerprint, (d)
mixing different fingerprints with the same fingerprint result in different identities, and (e)
the proposed method can be utilized to generate a database ofjoint identities from a fixed
fingerprint dataset.
Hence, the concept of fingerprint mixing can be utilized in the following examples to en-
hance the privacy of a fingerprint recognition system.
Scenario I: Consider a fingerprint system in which the left index finger,FLs, of a subject
IDs is being enrolled. During enrollment, an impression of another finger of the subject
(say the right index finger,FRs) is mixed withFLs resulting in a mixed printMs. Next,
Ms is stored in the central database while the imagesFLs andFRs are discarded. During
authentication, the subject offers a sample of the left index finger,FL′s, and a sample of the
right index finger,FR′s. These two images are then mixed resulting in a new printM
′
s. In
order to verify the subject’s identity,M ′s is compared withMs in the database. Therefore,
the original fingerprint images of the left and right index fingers are never stored in the
database.
Scenario II: Consider a remote fingerprint database that maintains a small et of pre-
selected auxiliary fingerprints,A, corresponding to multiple fingers (each finger inA is
assumed to have multiple impressions). Suppose that subject IDs offers the left index
fingerprint,FLs, during enrollment at a local machine. At that time, the locam chine
decomposes the fingerprintFLs into two components, i.e., the spiral component and the
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continuous component. To ensure the privacy of the fingerprint image, the remote system
sends the stored fingerprints in the auxiliary set and the local machine searches through the
received fingerprints to locate a “compatible” fingerprint based on the continuous compo-
nent ofFLs (see Section 3.2), sayFm ∈ A (here the subscriptm denotes a specific finger
in the auxiliary set), which is then decomposed and its continuous component is mixed
with FLs at the local machine. The template of the new mixed printMs is enrolled in the
remote system database andFLs is discarded from the local machine. During authenti-
cation, when the subject presents a sample of the left index finger,FL′s, it is decomposed
and its continuous component is used to search through the fing rprints in the auxiliary
set from the remote fingerprint system to determine the most “compatible” fingerprint, say
Fn ∈ A. At the local machine, the spiral component ofFL′s is mixed with the continuous
component ofFn ∈ A to generate a mixed fingerprintM ′s, which is then compared against
the database entryMs. Figure 3.17 shows the employed protocol to protect the privacy of
a fingerprint image by mixing the input fingerprint image withanother fingerprint from a
set of pre-selected auxiliary fingerprints. The security protocol (illustrated in Figure 3.17)
ensures that during the enrollment or the authentication prcess, the identities of the users
will not be revealed by the fingerprint system. Further, since privacy of the input finger-
prints is the main concern, the privacy of the stored auxiliary set, e.g.A, could be preserved
by storing just the continuous components of its pre-selectd fingerprints.
3.4.1 Research Contribution
• Designing a new cancelability structure for fingerprint templates.
• Generating a fingerprint image from different fingerprint instances.
• Proposing a complete approach to decompose a fingerprint image.
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Mixing Faces For Generating Joint
Identities
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, our goal is generating a joint identity by mixing two face images. Therefore,
we explore the possibility of mixing face images of different subjects and determine how this new
mixed face image will perform during the authentication process. Moreover, we investigate the
possibility of generating a realistic face image that maintains a close similarity with the original
face images. The generated joint identity and the original identities should reside in adjacent
identity subspaces∗ (i.e., similar facial features and may be appearance) even if these original
face images are associated with individuals who are different in race, gender and/or age.
Generating interpersonal face images by mashing celebritis’ or family members’ faces has
received a lot of attention from digital artists to reveal the resemblance or difference between two
face images (see Figure 4.1). In other cases, digital artists engage in such exercise as a challenge
to mix two different face images and create a face image that looks familiar. Moreover, as shown
in Figure 4.2, hybrid faces [95] is another example of a face image that visually can be interpreted
as two faces. These different interpretations are based on the way humans process visual input,
i.e., the viewing distance or image resolution. For example, to generate a hybrid face, two face
images are summed at two different spatial scales: low-spatial scale (filtered by a low-pass filter)
and the high-spatial scale (filtered by a high-pass filter) [95].
In this chapter, we discuss another scheme for generating a mixed face image that matches
∗Here, the face-space is assumed to be partitioned into identity regions [94].
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4.1: Examples of interpersonal faces generated by digital artists; (a) melding the smiles of
Barack Obama and Malcolm X (source [8]), (b) splicing familymembers’ faces (i.e., mother and
daughter) together “genetic portraits” (source [9]), and (c) Morphing face images of two singers
on an album cover (source [10]).
with both the component face images used to generate it. Mixing is possible even if the compo-
nent face images differ in race, gender and/or age. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows.
Section 4.2 discusses in more detail how the face morphing technique was adopted for mixing
faces. Section 4.3 reports the experimental results and Section 4.4 summarizes the chapter.
4.2 Mixing Faces: The proposed approach
To generate an interpersonal face image, the principle of face morphing is used. Consider
two face imagesF1 andF2. The morphing algorithm generates an intermediate image that is
referred to as an interpersonal face image. The generated fac image could be anywhere along
the continuum fromF1 to F2 and its position on this continuum is specified by the morphing
parameters. The parameters, described later, are used to determine the rate of warping and color
blending. So, as the morphing proceeds along the continuum fro F1 to F2, the first image (F1)
is gradually distorted and is faded out, while the second image (F2) is faded in (see Figure 4.5).
Ever since Galton [96] developed the first facial compositing echnique in 1878 (which can be
considered to be the first attempt in generating an interpersonal face image), many studies have
been conducted to analyze various aspects of different facemorphing techniques [97, 98, 99, 100,
101, 102, 103]. While most of them state that the generated int rpersonal face image is similar
to the original images, this assertion was only based on human perception. To the best of our
knowledge, there has been no systematic study showing how close the morphed face image is to
the original face images and the possibility of using the intrpersonal face image as a biometric
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(a) Face image 1 (b) Face image 2
(c) Hybrid face
Figure 4.2: A hybrid face (see (c)) constructed from low-frequ ncy components of face image 1
in (a) and high-frequency components of face image 2 in (b).
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indicator from the perspective of automated face recognitio systems. As shown in Figure 4.3,
there are three distinct phases in the generation of an interpersonal face image (MF ) : facial
feature extraction, image warping and cross-dissolving.
Figure 4.3: Proposed approach for generating an interpersonal face.
4.2.1 Facial feature extraction
Morphing two face images to generate an interpersonal face image involves the nontrivial
task of locating facial features. For both face images,F1 andF2, the prominent facial features
are characterized by a pre-defined set of control points. Both se s of control points,X1 and
X2, associated with the two face images (see Figure 4.3), are sto d in a vector format. This
representation does not include any information about the connection between them:
Xj = [x1j , x2j , x3j , . . . , xnj, y1j, y2j, y3j, . . . ynj]
T , (4.1)
wherej ∈ {1, 2} andn = 56 is the number of control points. Since extracting control points
automatically [62] is not the focus of this work, a pre-annotated face image database was used
(see Section 4.3).
4.2.2 Image warping
Once the corresponding control points between the two face images are known, the next step
is to perform image warping by mapping each facial feature (e.g., mouth, nose and eyes) in the
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individual face images to its corresponding feature in the int rpersonal image. A triangulation-
based warping scheme is used to deform the face images [104].First, the intermediate control
points set (which defines the shape of the facial features of the interpersonal face image) is de-
termined. From the control point setsX1 andX2 of the face imagesF1 andF2, respectively, the
intermediate control point set (Xm) is linearly interpolated as follows:
Xm = (1− α) ·X1 + α ·X2, (4.2)
whereα ∈ [0, 1] is thewarping factor that determines how the individual shapes of the two face
images are integrated into the shape of the interpersonal face.
Next, the face region of each face image is dissected into a suitable set of triangles by utilizing
corresponding control points as the vertices of the triangles. Generating an optimal triangulation
has to be guaranteed in order to avoid skinny triangles and, therefore, Delaunay triangulation was
utilized to construct a triangular mesh for each face image.An example of face images tessellated
into triangular regions according to the annotated controlpoints is shown in Figure 4.3.
Finally, the affine transformation that relates each triangular region in the original face im-
age (F1 or F2) to the corresponding triangle region in the intermediate image is computed.
Suppose thatT1 = [P1, P2, P3]T (T2 = [R1, R2, R3]T ) is a triangular region inX1 (X2) and
Tm = [Q1, Q2, Q3]
T is the corresponding triangular region inXm (see Figure 4.4).A1 (A2) is the
affine transformation that maps all points inT1 (T2) ontoTm.
Tm = AjTj , (4.3)






Together,T1’s (T2’s) vertices andTm’s vertices are used in equation (4.3) to compute the
parameters of the affine transformationA1 (A2) (i.e.,a1, a2, a3, a4, t1, t2).





F ′2 have similar shapes.
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Figure 4.4: An illustration for the corresponding triangles between the faces’ shapes and inter-
personal face’s shape.
4.2.3 Image cross-dissolving
The final step to obtain the interpersonal face image of the two face imagesF1 andF2, is
simply a cross-dissolving process of the two warped images.If F ′1 andF
′
2 are the warped images,
the mixed face image is obtained by linearly interpolating their pixel intensities, such that
MF = (1− β) · F ′1 + β · F ′2, (4.4)
whereβ ∈ [0, 1] is thecolor-dissolving factor that determines the relative influence of the ap-
pearance of the two face images on the interpersonal face imageMF .
Figure 4.5 shows different examples of interpersonal face images along the continuum from
F1 to F2 by varying the warping factor (α) and the cross-dissolving factor (β).
4.3 Experiments and Discussion
The performance of the proposed approach to generate mixed fac s was tested using the
XM2VTS database. This database was used since the facial landmarks (control points) of in-
dividual images were manually annotated and available online. The XM2VTS frontal image
database [105] consists of 8 frontal face images each of 295 subjects. For each subject, four
samples were used as the probe image and the remaining four samples were added to the gallery
resulting in a probe setP and gallery setG each containing 1180 face images. In the following
experiments, the match scores were generated using the Verilook SDK. In order to establish the
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Figure 4.5: Interpersonal face images along the continuum fro F1 to F2 at different position
whereα = β = (a) 0.2, (b) 0.3, (c) 0.4, (d) 0.5, (e) 0.6, (f) 0.7 and (g) 0.8.
baseline performance, the images inP were matched against those inG. This resulted in a rank-1
accuracy of 98% and an Equal Error Rate (EER) of 5%. To generate the interpersonal face image
from two face imagesF1 andF2, the morphing technique described earlier was utilized andthe
generated face image can be anywhere along the continuum from F1 to F2. But where on this
continuous continuum should the interpersonal face image be?
The position of the interpersonal face on this continuum is specified by the morphing parame-
ters, i.e.,α andβ. Although the two parameters can be different, the best quality of interpersonal
face images along this continuum is observed to be obtained when assigning the same value to
the two factors.
In this chapter, our objective is to generate an interpersonal face image that is unique and
also has an identity subspace close to the identity subspaceof component face images (F1 and
F2). Therefore, the similarity between the interpersonal face images (MF ) that are generated for
different values of morphing parameters (α andβ) and the component face images was examined.
Face images of two different identities inP were randomlypaired. Different interpersonal
face images were generated by morphing the two face images ofeach pair with 7 different values
of α andβ (α = β = {0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8}). This resulted in 7 probe sets and each
probe set consisted of 588 face images (i.e., 147 joint identiti s with 4 samples for each identity).
The corresponding pairs of face images inG were also mixed with the corresponding values of
α andβ resulting in 7 gallery sets and each gallery set consisted of147 joint identities (each
identity has 4 face image samples).
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Figure 4.6 shows the ROC curves of matching the interpersonal face images against the cor-
responding component imagesF1 andF2, respectively. Based on these curves, and in order to
ensure that the interpersonal face image is influenced to thesame degree by the two component,
α andβ were selected to be 0.5 in the following experiments.


























































Figure 4.6: ROC curves of matching interpersonal face images ( nerated with different values
of α andβ) against the corresponding original images (a)F1 and (b)F2.
Computational time We evaluated the time complexity of the approach usingMatlab R©-2013a
on a PC withIntel R© i7 CPU @2.8GHz and 8GB memory. The elapsed time of mixing two face
images is 2 seconds.
4.3.1 Experimental design
In the following subsections, different experiments are discussed. These experiments were
designed in order to address the following questions:
1. Can two interpersonal faces pertaining to the same joint ident ty be successfully matched?
2. Are the original faces and the interpersonal face image similar? In this work, note that our
objective is to generate a joint identity that matches with both component identities.
3. If a set of face images are mixed with a common face image, then are the resulting joint iden-
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tities different from one another? The interpersonal face images must be sufficiently different,
even if they share one common face. Another way of looking at this is as follows: if two different
face images,F1 andF2, are fused with the same face imageFm, are the resulting interpersonal
face images,MF1 andMF2, similar? From the perspective of the distinctiveness prope ty of
biometrics, they shouldnotbe similar.
4. Does the degree of similarity of dissimilarity between the wo original face images affect the
recognition performance of the mixed face?
5. Can mixing faces be an alternative approach to obscure a demographic attribute of a database
such as the gender of users enrolled in a face recognition system?
4.3.2 Performance metrics
The notion of similarity/dissimilarity is assessed using the match scores generated by a face
matcher. A high degree of similarity is stated to exist betwen a probe image and a gallery
image, if the similarity match score between the two images is generally higher than (a) the
scores between the probe image andothergallery images, and (b) the scores between the gallery
image andotherprobes. Thus, in the context of identification, a higher rank-1 accuracy would
imply a higher similarity; in the context of verification, a lower Equal Error Rate (EER) would
imply higher similarity. So we use rank-1 accuracy and EER tocharacterize notions of similarity
and dissimilarity.
4.3.3 Experiment 1: Matching two interpersonal face images
In this experiment, the matching performance of interpersonal face images generated by mix-
ing random pairs of faces is reported. The process of mixing ra dom pairs of face images inP
to generateMF P and then mixing the corresponding pairs inG to generateMFG is repeated
20 times. This resulted in twenty differentMF P sets and their correspondingMFG sets. When
matching eachMF P set against the correspondingMFG set, the average of the resultant rank-1
accuracies was∼ 95% and the average of the EERs was∼ 8%. The reasonably good recognition
rates suggest that the interpersonal face images can be usedas biometric indicators for the joint
identities. Figure 4.7 shows examples of mixing pairs of face images.
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Figure 4.7: Examples of interpersonal face images. These face images are generated by mixing
face images that are different in terms of gender (as in (a)),r ce (as in (a) and (b)), and/or age (as
in (c)).
4.3.4 Experiment 2: Similarity to the original face images
In this experiment, the similarity between the interpersonal face image and the component
face images was evaluated. Recall that the objective of thiswork is to generate a mixed face image
that is sufficiently similar to both component faces. Therefo , the interpersonal face images
generated in Experiment 1 were matched against the originalcomponent images in gallery set
G. Here, a genuine score is generated when the interpersonal face image is matched with either
of the component face images (the rest are impostor scores).The average of resultant rank-1
accuracies was 95% (and the average of EERs was 9%). These results show some evidence
that the original face images are similar to the interpersonal image. The similarity between the
mixed and original faces can be further enhanced by exploring alternate algorithms for mixing
the different face images.
4.3.5 Experiment 3: Mixing with a common face image
The purpose of this experiment was to investigate if mixing two different face images,F1 and
F2, with a common face imageFm, results in interpersonal face imagesMF1 andMF2 that are
sufficiently dissimilar from each other.
For example, the 8 samples ofFm is mixed with the 8 samples ofF1 (i.e., the first face image
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of remaining face images after selectingFm), and the resulted mixed samples (8 samples) are
pertaining to the first joint identityJ1. Then, 4 Samples ofJ1 are added toMF P and the other
4 are added toMFG. Similarly, if samples of the face imageFm is mixed with the 8 samples
of F2 (i.e., the second face image of remaining face images) and the resulted mixed samples (8
samples) are pertaining to the first joint identityJ2. Then, 4 Samples ofJ2 are added toMF P
and the other 4 are added toMFG. Hence, 16 genuine scores will be generated by matching the
4 samples ofJ1 in MF P against the other 4 samples ofJ1 in MFG. Meanwhile, 16 impostor
scores will be generated by matching the 4 samples ofJ1 in MF P against the 4 samples ofJ2 in
MFG.
To achieve the goal of this work, the interpersonal face images must be sufficiently different,
even if they share one common face.
To evaluate this, a face image (Fm) in the probe setP was arbitrarily selected and mixed
with the remaining face images in that set to generate the setMF P . The same pairs of images
were mixed in the gallery setG resulting inMFG. Each set now has 1176 interpersonal face
images for 294 joint identities (i.e., 4 samples for each joint identity). This selection and mixing
process is done 20 times, each time selecting a different face image asFm. This resulted in twenty
differentMF P sets and their correspondingMFG sets. When matching eachMF P set against
the correspondingMFG set, the average of the resultant rank-1 accuracies was∼ 85% and the
average of the EERs was∼ 10%. These numbers suggest that the the interpersonal face images
are sufficiently different, even though they share a common component face image. However, it
must be noted that the distinctiveness has decreased compared to Experiment 2.
4.3.6 Experiment 4: Mixing look-alike face images
The purpose of this experiment is to investigate the effect of mixing look-alike face images
[106]. The purpose here is to determine if the similarity (ordissimilarity) between the face images
to be mixed has any impact on the distinctiveness of the resulting interpersonal face image. The
matching scores are used as a metric to select pairs of face images that look alike.
Experiment 4a: F1 and F2 look alike
To mix look-alike faces, pairs whose matching score is more than an empirical threshold (1/10
* highest impostor score) were selected and mixed resultingin a probe setMF P1 and a gallery
setMFG1 . Each set consists of 588 face images (i.e., 147 joint identiti s with 4 samples for
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each identity) - this number can be changed by altering the empirical threshold. Figure 4.8
shows examples of the generated face images. MatchingMF P1 againstMF
G
1 resulted in a rank-
1 accuracy of∼ 95% and an EER of∼ 8%.
Meanwhile, matchingMFG1 against the component face images (as in Experiment 2 but here
the components are look-alike faces) resulted in an averageof rank-1 accuracies of∼ 8% and an
average of EERs of∼ 94%.
Figure 4.8: Examples of interpersonal face images generated by mixing pairs of look-alike face
images based on the matching scores.
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Experiment 4b: F1 and F2 do not look alike
To generate mixed face images from pairs of face images whichare dissimilar (i.e., do not look-
alike), pairs whose matching scores equal zero were selected and mixed resulting in a probe set
MF P2 and a gallery setMF
G
2 . Each set consists of 588 interpersonal face images. Matching
MF P2 againstMF
G
2 resulted in a rank-1 accuracy of∼ 95% and an EER of∼ 9%.
MatchingMFG2 against the component face images (as in Experiment 2 but here t com-
ponents are not look-alike faces) resulted in an average of rank-1 accuracies of∼ 80% and an
average of EERs of∼ 15%.
Upon comparing the results of Experiments 4a and 4b with the results of Experiment 1, we
observe that there is no big difference in the identificationaccuracy and the verification accuracy.
These results demonstrate that the degree of similarity or dissimilarity between the face images to
be mixed has almost no influence on the recognition performance of the generated joint identities.
Nonetheless, the influence is noticeable when the similarity be ween component face images
and the mixed faces was tested. The mixed faces are more similar to their components if they are
look-alike faces than if they are dissimilar. Note that, in this experiment, the components have
been assigned based on the matching score. This may not be thecaus of real scenarios which
have been examined in Experiment 2 by mixing random pairs from a face database.
Results of the 4 experiments are summarized in Table 4.1.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, it was demonstrated that the concept of “mixing faces” can be utilized to
generate a joint identity. To mix two face images, a face morphing technique was adopted in
this work. The mixed face image lies in the continuum betweenth two component faces and
its position on this continuum is specified by the mixing parameters. We also investigated the
possibility of generating a mixed face image when the two comp nent images are different in
terms of race, gender and/or age (see Figure 4.7). Further, we determined if the similarity (or
dissimilarity) between the face images to be mixed has any impact on the distinctiveness of
the resulting interpersonal face image. Experiments on theXM2VTS dataset, which have been
summarized in Table 4.1, indicate that (a) the mixed face image representing a new joint identity























Table 4.1: Results of the experiments
Experiment Description Rank-1 accuracy(%) EER (%) Implication
1 Matching two interpersonal 95 8 Mixed faces can be
face images used as biometric identifiers
2 Similarity to the original 95 9 The mixed face exhibits similarity
face images to both the component faces
3 Mixing with a common 85 10 The mixed faces are reasonably different,
face image even if they share a common face image
4 (a)F1 andF2 look alike 95 8 The degree of similarity between
the original face images to be mixed
(b) F1 andF2 do not look alike 95 9 has almost no influence on
the recognition performance
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the component faces, and (c) the mixing process is not undulyimpacted by differences in gender,
race, age and similarity between component images.
4.4.1 Research Contribution
• Defining the concept of digital joint identity through face images.
• Generating a face image from different face instances.
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Chapter 5
Mixing Irises For Generating Joint
Identities
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, our goal is to generate a joint identity by mixing two iris images acquired from
two differenteyes. We investigate the possibility of mixing irises in order to generate a realistic
iris image that maintains a close similarity with the original components. In the following, some
of the applications of the proposed approach are discussed.
• Generating Joint Identities: Mixing irises can be utilized to generate a new iris image
by fusing two different iris images acquired from two different eyes. In the context of
iris, image level fusion approaches have been developed to combine different video frames
of the same iris instance to improve the iris recognition performance [49] [50]. Also,
fusing irises has been proposed in Zuo et al.’s work to de-ident fy normalized iris images
[51]. They proposed a de-identifying function which adds a synthetic iris image to the
original iris image. In this chapter, a new approach to fuse iris images is introduced by
mixing iris images. The objective of this work is to generatemixed iris image that is
sufficiently similar to both component iris. Therefore, themixed iris image can be used for
authentication of individuals who share a joint bank account.
• Multi-eye Authentication System: Patterns of the left iris of an individual are assumed to
be different from those of right iris in the context of iris recognition systems [107][108].
Therefore, during the enrollment phase of an iris-based authentication system, the oper-
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ator/usermustindicate the iris from which eye is enrolled. Then, during recognition, the
system must capture the iris from the same eye image so that itcan be successfully matched
with the corresponding one in the database. In many deployment sc narios, it is easy for the
operator/user to mislabel the eyes. Mislabeling in this case can lead to a drop in the match-
ing performance as the captured iris image during the recogniti n will not be matched with
the stored one in the database. In response to this problem, classifiers to determine whether
an eye image is a left or right eye have been developed to detect errors in the labeled data.
One initial approach for differentiating between left and right eyes uses the locations of the
pupil center and the iris center [109]. The pupil is often located on the nasal side of iris
rather than being directly concentric with it. Abiantun andSavvides [110] evaluated five
different methods for detecting the tear duct in an iris image in order to classify eye images
as being left or right: (1) Adaboost algorithm with Haar-like features, (2) Adaboost with
a mix of Haar-like and Gabor features, (3) support vector machines, (4) linear discrimi-
nant analysis, and (5) principal component analysis. Another study [111] used active shape
models (ASMs) to determine the shape of the eye and predict whe her an eye is a right or
left eye.
Mixing irises can be considered as an alternative method to allevi te this problem by mix-
ing the left and right irises during the enrollment phase andstoring the mixed iris image.
During the recognition phase, the stored mixed iris will match correctly with the captured
probe iris irrespective of it being the left or right iris image or even the mixed iris image
from both eyes. Therefore, the concept of mixing irises can be utilized in a multi-eye au-
thentication system where the irises from the left and the right eyes of a single individual,
or left irises of two different individuals are mixed to generate a new iris image. This has
benefits in terms of performance by avoiding the enrollment error.
The mixing process (see Figure 5.1) begins by segmenting iris regions for two acquired eyes
and normalizing these segmented regions. Next, the optimalpixels from the two iris images are
copied on to a mixed iris image where the optimality is definedin terms of importance of each
pixel in the iris image. The selected pixels should be connected in such a way that will capture
the dominant features of the irises’ texture. These pixels could be in a single row in the form of
a horizontal bar. However, simply copying horizontal bars seems restrictive and places a hard
constraint on the location of optimal pixels. Hence, copying horizontal seams is proposed. A
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seam is a horizontal 8-connected path that contains only onepixel per column of the optimal
pixels. Extracting seams based on the concept of importancemap has been proposed in [112] for
content-aware resizing of images and is also known as seam carving.
Figure 5.1: Proposed approach for mixing irises.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the proposed approach
for mixing irises. Section 5.3 reports the experimental results and Section 5.4 summarizes the
chapter.
5.2 Mixing Irises: The proposed approach
Our approach to mix irises from two different eyes involves copying the most important
connected pixels, i.e., seams, from the normalized iris images into a new mixed iris image. The
importance of a pixel is defined by an importance map that evaluates the importance of each pixel
based on its contrast with its neighbors. Seams can be eithervertical or horizontal. A horizontal
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seam is a path of pixels connected from left to right in an image with one pixel in each column. A
vertical seam is similar with the exception of the connection being from top to bottom with one
pixel in each row. Here is an outline of the proposed approachto mix two iris images:
1. Generating normalized iris images
2. Constructing importance maps
3. Finding the optimal seams
4. Copying seams
5.2.1 Generating normalized iris images
Given two iris image, the irises have to be localized and isolated from the sclera, pupil, eye-
lids and eyelashes and this can be done by using a segmentation algorithm. In this chapter, we
used an approach that utilizes geodesic active contours [113] to segment the annular region of an
iris image. During the segmentation, a noise mask is generated to record the locations of eyelids
and eyelashes that may be occluding the true iris region. Grabbing pixels from iris regions to
copy them into a mixed iris image is computationally expensive and requires repeated Cartesian-
to-Polar coordinates conversions. Therefore, both the segmented irises and corresponding noise
masks are unwrapped into rectangular regions using Daugmans rubber sheet model [70]. This
allows the mixing irises approach to address pixels in simple rows and columns format. For a
detailed description and review of various eye localization, iris segmentation, and iris unwrap-
ping techniques, see [66], [114], [64] and [65]. Figure 5.2 shows an example of an eye and its
normalized iris and noise mask images.
5.2.2 Constructing importance maps
The next step in mixing irises is locating the important pixels in the original normalized iris
images in order to copy them into the mixed image. This is doneby assigning a value to every
pixel in the normalized iris image, where higher values meanhigher importance. In this work,
every pixel in a normalized iris imageI will have an corresponding value in the importance map
IM , which will be the absolute sum of both gradient components at that pixel.




Figure 5.2: Iris segmentation and normalization (a) An eye image. (b) The normalized iris image.






Figure 5.3 visualizes the importance map for the normalizedris image in Figure 5.2. This
also shows that using theL1 norm (see Equation 5.1) for computing the importance mapIM
highlighted the edges in the normalized iris texture, i.e.,the pixels along the edges have higher
importance.
Figure 5.3: Estimated importance map (IM) of the normalized iris image in Figure 5.2.
-
5.2.3 Finding the optimal seams
Mixing irises is done by repeatedly determining seams with the maximal importance from
two normalized iris images and copying them into the new mixed iris image. Therefore, once
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the importance map is calculated, the next step is to find the optimal horizontal or vertical seam
in normalized iris image,I. A horizontal (or a vertical) seamsh (sv) is an 8-connected path of
pixels that runs from the left (top) of the image to the right (bottom) with one pixel in each column
(row). The 8-connected property means that for each pixel, during the backtracing process, only
its 8 adjacent neighbors are considered. Based on this definition of a seam and given thatI is
a normalized iris image of sizen × m, wheren is the number of rows andm is the number of
columns, a horizontal seam is defined as [112]:
sh = {(Sh(j), j)}mj=1, s.t.∀j, |Sh(j)− Sh(j − 1)| ≤ 1, (5.2)
whereSh is a mapping function ofsh andSh(j) = 1, . . . , n. Similarly, a vertical seam is defined
by its mapping functionSv as:
sv = {(i, Sv(i))}ni=1, s.t.∀i, |Sv(i)− Sv(i− 1)| ≤ 1, (5.3)
whereSv(i) = 1, . . . , m.
The importance of a seams is defined as the sum of the associated importance values of pixels
lying on that seam in the importance map. Hence, given the importance mapIM , an optimal







To find horizontal or vertical optimal seams in order to copy them into the mixed iris images,
the dynamic programming concept is utilized and maximum cumulative importance maps are
created [112]. The maximum cumulative importance maps haveto b created separately for the
horizontal (Figure 5.4 - a) and vertical (Figure 5.4 - b) seams nd backtracking is done on these.
For example, to locate the optimal horizontal seam, the horizontal cumulative importance
mapCMh is computed. The first column in the importance mapIM is copied to the first column
in CMh and then,
CMh(i, j) = IM(i, j)+
max{IM(i− 1, j − 1), IM(i, j − 1), IM(i+ 1, j − 1)}.
(5.5)
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(a)
(b)
Figure 5.4: Cumulative importance maps (a) The horizontal map (CMh). (b) The vertical map
(CMv).
The optimal horizontal seam is determined by simply backtraing onCMh the maximum entry.
Figure 5.5 shows an example of a traced optimal seam on a normalized iris.
Figure 5.5: The traced optimal horizontal seam on the normalized iris image in Figure 5.2.
5.2.4 Copying seams
Let I1 andI2 be the two normalized iris images of sizen × m from two different eye im-
ages.IM1 andIM2 are their importance maps, respectively. The following step are invoked to
generate a mixed iris imageMI by copying horizontal seams fromI1 andI2:
1. MI =MIinitial (MIinitial is an initial image).
2. Find the optimal horizontal seams∗1h in I1.
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4. Replace the pixels ats∗1h in I1 andIM1 with black pixels.
I1(s
∗
1h) = 0 , IM1(s
∗
1h) = 0.




1h) = 0 , IM2(s
∗
1h) = 0.
6. Find the optimal horizontal seams∗2h in I2.




8. Replace the pixels ats∗2h in I2 andIM2 with black pixels.
I2(s
∗
2h) = 0 , IM2(s
∗
2h) = 0.




2h) = 0 , IM1(s
∗
2h) = 0.
10. Repeat steps from 2 to 9n times.
There are some remarks the mixing steps.
• Same steps can be used to copy vertical seams from the iris images instead of horizontal
seams. But this requires more iterations because the width of normalized images is much
larger than their height.
• If the mixed iris image was initially set to a blackn × m image, i.e., ifMIinitial is a
black image, the mixed iris image will exhibit black background as shown in Figure 5.6.
Therefore, in this work, the mixed iris image is initializedto I1, i.e., MIinitial = I1.
Figure 5.7 shows examples of mixed iris images whenMIinitial = I1.
• The noise mask of the mixed iris image is the union of the two noise masks of the two
original iris images.
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Figure 5.6: Examples of mixed iris images that were initialized to a black image.
Figure 5.7: Mixed iris images from Figure 5.6 when they are initialized asI1.
Computational time We evaluated the time complexity of the proposed approach usingMatlab R©-
2013a on a PC withIntel R© i7 CPU @2.8GHz and 8GB memory. The elapsed time for mixing
two iris images is 3 seconds.
5.3 Experiments and Discussion
The experiments were conducted on a subset of the CASIA-v3 database [115]. The CASIA-
v3 database consists of gray scale iris images captured using near infrared illumination. The
subset used in our experiments consists of the left eye images of 182 users with 2 samples per user.
The images in this dataset were segmented and normalized using the algorithms proposed by Shah
and Ross [113]. An open source Matlab implementation [116] based on the Daugman’s approach
[117] was used to encode and match the normalized irises. Theperformance of matching irises
is summarized using the Equal Error Rate (EER) and the rank-1identification rate. For each
iris, one sample was added to a probe setP and the other sample was added to a gallery setG
each containing 182 irises. In order to establish the baseline performance, the images inP were
matched against those inG. This resulted in a rank-1 accuracy of 100% and an Equal ErrorRate
(EER) of 1.4%.
5.3.1 Matching performance
In this experiment, the matching performance of generatingmixed irises from random pairs
of irises is reported. Random pairs of iris images inP were mixed in order to generateMIP
and then the corresponding pairs inG were mixed to generateMIG. As the mixed iris can be
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generated by copying horizontal or vertical seams, the results are reported for both cases below
by matchingMIP set against the correspondingMIG set.
Results of mixing by copying horizontal seams
The resultant rank-1 accuracy was∼ 96% and the EER was∼ 1.5%. The reasonably high
recognition rate indicates the possibility of mixing irises and suggests that the mixed iris can be
used as a biometric indicator. Figure 5.8 shows examples of mixed irises based on the copying of
horizontal seams.
Figure 5.8: Examples of mixed irises by copying horizontal se ms from the original components.
Mixed iris images are initialized withI1.
Results of mixing by copying vertical seams
The resultant rank-1 accuracy was∼ 0% and the EER was∼ 40%. The degradation in the
performance, in comparison with the previous experiment, indicates that mixing irises by copying
vertical seams may be not viable. This is because, during featur extractions the 1D log Gabor
filter is convolved with each row of the normalized iris image. In other words, the encoding and
matching process is row-based which causes a drop in the performance in case of mixing irises
based on vertical seams.
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5.3.2 Similarity to the original iris images
In this experiment, the objective of generating a mixed iristhat is similar to both the original
iris images is investigated. The mixed images (MI) in the probe set (MIP ), which are generated
in the previous experiment by copying horizontal seams fromthe original irises, were matched
against the corresponding original images (I1 andI2) in the gallery set ofG.
a. MatchingMI againstI1 resulted in rank-1 accuracy of∼ 100% and EER of∼ 1.5%.
b. MatchingMI againstI2 resulted in rank-1 accuracy of∼ 97% and EER of∼ 1.9%.
The high matching performance suggests that the original ident ty is sufficiently similar to
the mixed image. Note that there is a performance differencebetween the two cases since the
mixed image, in both cases, is initialized toI1 prior to copying the seams and this biases the
mixed image with respect toI1. The same difference in the performance is encountered if the
mixed image is initialized toI2, but this biases the mixed image with respect toI2.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, the possibility of generating a mixed iris by mixing two distinct irises is
explored. It was demonstrated that the concept of “mixing irises” can be utilized to (a) generate a
virtual identity and (b) generate mixed images that are similar to the original iris images. To mix
two irises, horizontal seams are copied from normalized iris images into a new iris image after
sorting them based on their importance in the images. Experiments on a CASIA-v3 dataset show
that (a) the mixed iris representing a joint identity can potentially be used for authentication,and
(b) the mixed iris is similar to the original irises.
5.4.1 Research Contribution
• Defining the concept of digital joint identity through iris images.
• Generating a mixed iris image from different instances.
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Chapter 6
Decomposing Faces For Privacy Protection
6.1 Introduction
A face recognition system operates by acquiring face image from a subject, extracting a fea-
ture set from the data (e.g., eigen-coefficients) and comparing the feature set against the templates
stored in a database in order to identify the subject or to verify a claimed identity. The template
of a person in the database is generated during enrollment and is often stored along with the
original face image. This has heightened the need to accord privacy∗ to the subject by adequately
protecting the contents of the database.
For protecting the privacy of an individual enrolled in a biometric database, Davida et al.
[29] and Ratha et al. [30] proposed storing a transformed face image instead of the original
image in the database. This was referred to as a private template [29] or a cancelable biometric
[30]. Feng et al. [118] proposed a three-step hybrid approach that combined the advantages
of cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics. Apart from these methods, various image hiding
approaches [119][120][121] have been suggested by researchers to provide anonymity to the
stored biometric data.
For according privacy to face images present in surveillance videos, Newton et al. [122]
and Gross et al. [123] introduced a face de-identification algorithm that minimized the chances
of performing automatic face recognition while preservingdetails of the face such as expression,
gender and age. Bitouk et al. [124] proposed a face swapping technique which protected the iden-
tity of a face image by automatically substituting it with replacements taken from a large library
of public face images. However, in the case of face swapping and aggressive de-identification
∗The term ”privacy” as used in this chapter refers to the de-identification of biometric data.
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the original face image can be lost. Recently, Moskovich andOsadchy [125] proposed a method
to perform secure face identification by representing a private face image with indexed facial
components extracted from a public face database.
In this chapter, Visual Cryptography techniques will be used to preserve privacy. Hence, the
privacy of a face image will be accorded by decomposing the original image into two face images
in such a way that the original image can be revealed only whenboth images are mixed; further,
the individual component images do not reveal any information about the original image. Figure
6.1 shows a block diagram of the proposed approach. In this appro ch, a private face image is
decomposed into two independent public host images; thus, te private image can be viewed as
being encrypted into two host face images.
During the enrollment process, the private face image is sent to a trusted third-party entity.
Once the trusted entity receives it, the biometric data is decomposed into two images and the
original data is discarded. The decomposed components are then transmitted and stored in two
different database servers such that the identity of the private face image is not revealed to either
server. During the authentication process, the trusted entity sends a request to each server and
the corresponding sheets are transmitted to it. Sheets are mixed (i.e., superimposed) in order to
reconstruct the private image thereby avoiding any complicated decryption and decoding com-
putations that are used in watermarking [119][120], stegano raphy [121] or cryptosystem [27]
approaches. Once the matching score is computed, the mixed fac image is discarded. Further,
co-operation between the two servers is essential in order to r construct the original face image.
Decomposing the private face image into face images as hosts(as opposed to using random
noise or other natural images) has several benefits in the cont xt of biometric applications. First,
the demographic attributes of the private face images such as age, gender, ethnicity, etc. can
be retained in the host images thereby preserving the demographic aspects of the face while
perturbing its identity. Alternately, these demographic attributes, as manifested in an individual’s
face, can also be deliberately distorted by selecting host images with opposite attributes as that
of the private image. Second, a set of public face images (e.g., those of celebrities) may be used
to host the private face database. In essence, a small set of public images can be used to encrypt
the entire set of private face images. Third, using non-faceimages as hosts may result in visually
revealing the existence of a secret face as can be seen in Figure 6.3. Finally, while decomposing
the face image into random noise structures may be preferable, it can pique the interest of an
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Figure 6.1: Proposed approach for de-identifying and storing a face image
eavesdropper by suggesting the existence of secret data.
Additionally, the proposed approach addresses the following template protection require-
ments [27][126].
(1) Diversity: Since different applications can adopt different sets of host images for encrypting
the same private face image, cross-matching across applications to reveal the identity of a private
face image will be difficult.
(2) Revocability: If the private data is deemed to be compromised, then it can bedecomposed
again into two new sheets based on new host images. However, in r al ty, break-ins to a server
are very hard to detect when the attacker simply steals certain information without modifying the
stored data. To strengthen security, the decomposing operation can be periodically invoked at
regular time intervals.
(3) Security: It is computationally hard to obtain the private biometric image from the individual
stored sheets due to the use of visual cryptography. Furthermor , the private image is revealed
only when both sheets are simultaneously available. By using d stributed servers to store the
sheets, the possibility of obtaining the original private image is minimized. There have been
numerous efforts in the literature to guarantee that the data stored in distributed databases are
protected from unauthorized modification and inaccurate updates (e.g., [127]).
(4) Performance:As will be shown in the experiments section, the recognitionperformance due
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to the reconstructed image is not significantly degraded after decryption.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2 a basic introduction to visual
cryptography and its extensions are presented. Section 6.3discuss the proposed approach for face
images. Section 6.4 reports the experimental results and Section 6.5 summarizes the chapter.
6.2 Visual Cryptography
One of the best known techniques to protect data such as biometr c templates [128] is Cryp-
tography. It is the art of sending and receiving encrypted messages that can be decrypted only by
the sender or the receiver. Encryption and decryption are accomplished by using mathematical
algorithms in such a way that no one but the intended recipient ca decrypt and read the mes-
sage. Naor and Shamir [129] introduced the Visual Cryptography Scheme (VCS) as a simple
and secure way to allow the secret sharing of images without any cryptographic computations.
VCS is a cryptographic technique that allows for the encryption of visual information such that
decryption can be performed using the human visual system. The basic scheme is referred to
as thek-out-of-n visual cryptography scheme which is denoted as(k, n) VCS [129]. Given an
original binary imageT , it is encrypted inn images, such that:
T = Sh1 ⊕ Sh2 ⊕ Sh3 ⊕ . . .⊕ Shk (6.1)
where⊕ is a boolean operation,Shi, hi ∈ 1, 2, ...., k is an image which appears as white
noise,k ≤ n, andn is the number of noisy images. It is difficult to decipher the secret imageT
using individualShi ’s [129]. The encryption is undertaken in such a way thatk or more out of
then generated images are necessary for reconstructing the original imageT .
In the case of(2, 2) VCS, each pixelP in the original image is encrypted into two sub-pixels
called shares. Figure 6.2 denotes the shares of a white pixeland a black pixel. Note that the choice
of shares for a white and black pixel is randomly determined (there are two choices available for
each pixel). Neither shares provide any clue about the original pixel since different pixels in
the secret image will be encrypted using independent randomchoices. When the two shares are
superimposed, the value of the original pixelP can be determined. IfP is a black pixel, we get
two black sub-pixels; if it is a white pixel, we get one black sub-pixel and one white sub-pixel.
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Therefore, the reconstructed image will be twice the width of the original secret image and there
will be a 50% loss in contrast [129]. However, the original image will become visible.
Figure 6.2: Illustration of a 2-out-of-2 VCS scheme with 2 sub-pixels construction
In 2002, Nakajima and Yamaguchi [11] presented a 2-out-of-2Extended Visual Cryptogra-
phy Scheme for natural images. They suggested a theoreticalframework for encoding a natural
image in innocuous images as illustrated in Figures 6.3 and 6.4. This is known as the Gray-level
Extended Visual Cryptography Scheme (GEVCS). In this work,the extended visual cryptogra-
(a) (b) (c)
(e) (f) (g)
Figure 6.3: Encryption of a private face image in two standard host images. (a) Camera-man
image. (b) Lena image. (c) A private face image. (e) and (f) The two host images after visual
encryption (two sheets). (g) Result of superimposing (e) and (f)
phy scheme for grayscale images is used to secure face imagesby decomposing a private face
image into two host images. Then, mixing, i.e., overlying the host images reveals the secret im-
age. The basic Visual Cryptography scheme and its extension(GEVCS) are discussed in detail
below.
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(a) (b) (c)
(e) (f) (g)
Figure 6.4: Encryption of a private face image in two pre-aligned and cropped face images. (a)
and (b) are two host images. (c) is a private face image. (e) and (f) are the host images after
visual encryption (two sheets). (g) is the result of mixing (e) and (f)
6.2.1 Visual Cryptography Scheme
There are a few basic definitions which need to be provided before formally defining the VCS
model and its extensions.
(1) Secret image (O): The original image that has to be hidden. In our application,this is the
private face image.
(2) Hosts (H ′s): These are the face images used to encrypt the secret image usin the Gray-level
Extended Visual Cryptography Scheme (GEVCS). In our application, these correspond to the
face images in the public dataset.
(3) Sheets (S ′s): The secret image is encrypted inton sheet images which appear as random
noise images (in the case of(k, n) VCS) or as a natural host image (in the case of GEVCS).
(4) Target (T ): The image reconstructed by mixing (i.e., superimposing) the sheets.
(5) Sub-pixel: Each pixelP is divided into a certain number of sub-pixels during the encryption
process.
(6) Pixel Expansion (m): The number of sub-pixels used by the sheet images to encode each
pixel of the original image.
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(7) Shares: Each pixel is encrypted byn collections ofm black-and-white sub-pixels. These
collections of sub-pixels are known as shares.
(8) Relative Contrast (α): The difference in intensity measure between a black pixel and a white
pixel in the target image.
(9) OR-ed m-vector (V ): An n × m matrix is transformed to anm-dimensional vector by
applying the booleanOR operation across each of them columns.
(10) Hamming weight (H(V )): The number of ‘1’ bits in a binary vectorV .
Thek-out-of-n VCS deals with binary images. Each pixel is reproduced asn shares with each
share consisting ofm sub-pixels. This can be represented and described by ann × m boolean
matrixB= [bij ] wherebij = 1 if and only if thejth sub-pixel in theith share is black. TheB
matrix is selected randomly from one of two collections ofn ×m boolean matricesC0 andC1;
the size of each collection isr. If the pixelP in the secret image is a white pixel, one of the
matrices inC0 is randomly chosen; if it is a black pixel, a matrix fromC1 is randomly chosen.
Upon overlaying these shares, a gray level for the pixelP of the target image becomes visible and
it is proportional to the Hamming weight,H(V ), of theOR-edm-vectorV for a given matrixB.
It is interpreted visually as black ifH(V ) ≥ d and as white ifH(V ) < d − αm for some fixed
threshold1 ≤ d ≤ m and relative differenceα > 0. The contrast of the target is the difference
between the minimumH(V ) value of a black pixel and the maximum allowedH(V ) value for a
white pixel, which is proportional to the relative contrast(α) and the pixel expansion (m). The
scheme is considered valid if the following three conditions are satisfied.
Condition (1) For any matrixB inC0, theOR operation on anyk of then rows satisfiesH(V ) <
d− αm.
Condition (2): For any matrixB in C1, theOR operation on anyk of the n rows satisfies
H(V ) ≥ d.
Condition (3): Consider extractingq rows,q < k, from two matrices,B0 ∈ C0 andB1 ∈ C1






1 are indistinguishable in that there exists
a permutation of columns ofB′0 which would result inB
′
1. In other words, anyq × m matrix
B0 ∈ C0 andB1 ∈ C1 are identical up to a column permutation.
Conditions (1) and (2) define the image contrast due to VCS. Conditi n (3) imparts the security
property of a(k, n) VCS which states that the careful examination of fewer thank shares will
not provide information about the original pixelP . Therefore, the important parameters of the
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scheme are the following. First, the number of sub-pixels ina share (m); this parameter represents
the loss in resolution from the original image to the resultant rget image and it needs to be as
small as possible such that the target image is still visible. In addition, them sub-pixels need to
be in the form of av × v matrix wherev ∈ N in order to preserve the aspect ratio of the original
image. Second,α, which is the relative difference in the Hamming weight of the combined shares
corresponding to a white pixel and that of a black pixel in theoriginal image; this parameter
represents the loss in contrast and it needs to be as large as possible to ensure visibility of the
target pixel. Finally, the size of the collection ofC0 andC1, r, which represents the number of
possibilities forB. This parameter does not directly affect the quality of the target image.
The scheme can be illustrated by a(2, 2) VCS example which is shown in Figure 6.5. One
pixel of the original image corresponds to four pixels in each share. Therefore, six patterns of
shares are possible. Based on this, the following collection of matrices are defined:
C0 = {all the matrices obtained by permuting the columns of
[
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
]
}
C1 = {all the matrices obtained by permuting the columns of
[
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
]
}
This 2-out-of-2 visual cryptography scheme has the parametersm = 4, α = 1/2 andr = 6. A
secret image is encrypted by selecting shares in the following manner. If the pixel of the secret
binary image is white, the same pattern of four pixels for both shares is randomly selected which
is equivalent to randomly selecting a boolean matrixB from the collectionC0. If the pixel of the
original image is black, a complementary pair of patterns israndomly picked which is equivalent
to selecting a boolean matrixB from the collectionC1. Condition (1) and (2) can be easily tested
to validate this (2,2) VCS. The last condition which is relatd o the security of the scheme can
be verified by taking any row fromB0 ∈ C0 andB1 ∈ C1 and observing that they have the same
frequency of black and white values.
6.2.2 Gray-level Extended Visual Cryptography Scheme (GEVCS)
VCS allows one to encode a secret image inton sheet images, each revealing no information
about the original. Since these sheets appear as a random setof pixels, they may pique the cu-
riosity of an interceptor by suggesting the existence of a secret image. To mitigate this concern,
the sheets could be reformulated as natural images as statedby Naor and Shamir [129]. Ateniese
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Figure 6.5: Illustration of a 2-out-of-2 scheme with 4 sub-pixel construction
et al. [130] introduced such a framework known as the Extended Visual Cryptography scheme.
Nakajima and Yamaguchi [11] proposed a theoretical framework to apply Extended Visual Cryp-
tography on grayscale images (GEVCS) and also introduced a method to enhance the contrast of
the target images. The Gray-level Extended Visual Cryptography Scheme (GEVCS) operates by
changing the dynamic range of the original and host images, transforming the gray-level images
into meaningful binary images (also known as halftoned images) and then applying a boolean
operation on the halftoned pixels of the two hosts and the original image. However, some of
these pixels (in the host and the original) have to be furthermodified. This is explained in more
detail below.
Digital Halftoning and Pixel Expansion
Digital Halftoning is a technique for transforming a digital gray-scale image to an array of
binary values represented as dots in the printing process [131]. Error diffusion is a type of halfton-
ing technique in which the quantization error of a pixel is ditributed to neighboring pixels which
have not yet been processed. Floyd and Steinberg [132] describ d a system for performing error
diffusion on digital images based on a simple kernel. Their algorithm could also be used to pro-
duce output images with more than two levels. So, rather thanusing a single threshold to produce
a binary output, the closest permitted level is determined and the error, if any, is diffused to the
neighboring pixels according to the chosen kernel. Therefore, grayscale images are quantized to
a number of levels equalling the number of sub-pixels per share,m. During the dithering process
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at the pixel level, any continuous tone pixel is expanded to amatrix of black and white sub-pixels
defined by the gray level of the original pixel. The proportion of white sub-pixels in this matrix is
referred to as pixel transparency. In our application, the host images used for encrypting a private
face image and the private image itself are converted to halftoned images.
Encryption
The encryption process is applied on a pixel-by-pixel basisu ng the three halftoned images
(the two hosts and the original image). The arrangement of the sub-pixels in the shares of both the
hosts has to be controlled such that the required transparency (the number of white sub-pixels)
of the target pixel is obtained. The arrangement is determined based on the pixel transparencies
triplet. (t1, t2, tT ). t1, t2 andtT are transparencies of the entire sub-pixel region for share1, share
2 and the target, respectively.
Figure 6.6: Examples of sub-pixel arrangement
The security of the scheme is also important. Therefore, during encryption, a Boolean matrix
B is randomly selected from a set of 2 xm Boolean matricesCt1,t2tT for every pixel in the original
image. This is the primary difference between this scheme and Naor-Shamir’s scheme: in the
latter only a single collection of matrices is required which depends on the number of hosts and
the pixel expansion (m). Nakajima and Yamaguchi describe in detail the method to compute this
collection of Boolean matrices [11].
Figure 6.7: Example of impossible arrangements
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However, as shown in Figure 6.7, there are cases when the required transparency for the
corresponding pixel in the target image cannot be obtained,o matter how the shared sub-pixels
are rearranged. Therefore, to determine if it is possible toobtain the target transparency by
rearranging the transparent (white) sub-pixels in the shares, the target transparency must be within
the following range (condition (T1)) [11]:
tT ∈ [max(0, (t1 + t2 − 1)), min(t1, t2)], (6.2)
where,t1, t2 andtT (∈ [0, 1]) are the transparencies of the entire pixel region for share 1, share
2 and the target, respectively. The range of each of these transparencies for the entire image
corresponds to the dynamic range of the pixel intensities ofthe respective images. Assuming that
the dynamic ranges of the transparencies of the two sheets are he same,[L, U ] ⊆ [0, 1], all the
triplets, (t1, t2, tT ), would satisfy condition (T1) if and only if the dynamic range of the target
fulfils condition (T2) [11]:
tT ∈ [max(0, (2U − 1)), L]. (6.3)
Nakajima and Yamaguchi [11] described a method to enhance the image quality (contrast) and
decrease the number of violated triplets by performing an adaptive dynamic range compression.
In their method, the dynamic range of the sheets and the target e modified ast1, t2 ∈ [L, L +
K] ⊆ [0, 1]andtT ∈ [0, K] ⊆ [0, 1], respectively, whereL denotes the lower bound of the sheets’
dynamic range andK is a fixed value. It is clear that 0 is the most appropriate value for the
lower bound of the target to ensure that the target is darker than both sheets [11]. However, after
enhancing the contrast, it is necessary to consider conditi(T1) again before encryption. Thus,
if a triplet violates condition (T1), the gray levels of the conflicting triplets are adjusted and the
resulting errors diffused to the nearby pixels. Consequently, both halftoning and encryption are
done simultaneously to facilitate this adjustment.
To perform this adjustment, a3D-space is defined using the transparencies of the pixels in the
three images: thex-axis represents the transparencies of the pixels in share 1, they-axis repre-
sents the transparencies of the pixels in share 2 and thez-axis represents the transparencies of the
pixels in the target image. Any point in this space is characterized by a triplet representing trans-
parencies in the three images. The volume corresponding to the points for which reconstruction is
possible (Figure 6.6) is determined. Every point outside this volume is adjusted. Assume a point





T ) outside the determined volume. To encrypt this triplet without degrading the images,
p′ will be replaced withp” wherep”(t”1, t”2, t”T ) is the closest point top′ in the constructed
volume. Thus, the transparencies of the corresponding pixels in share 1, share 2, and target will
becomet”1, t”2 andt”T , respectively. If condition (T1) is violated, the errors are calculated and
























Figure 6.8: Flowchart for illustrating GEVCS at the pixel-lvel
6.3 Securing A Private Face Image by Mixing Host Images
Let P = {H1, H2, . . . , HN} be the public dataset containing a set of candidate host images
that can hide the assigned private face image,O. The first task is to select two host imagesHi and
Hj, i 6= j andi, j = 1, 2, . . .N from P . Note that due to variations in face geometry and texture
between the images in the public dataset and the private faceimage, the impact of the target
image on the sheet images and vice versa may become perceptible. This issue can be mitigated
if the host images for a particular private image are carefully chosen. Figure 6.9 shows the block
diagram that illustrates the key steps of the proposed approch. These steps will be explained in
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more detail in the following sub-sections.
Figure 6.9: Block diagram of the proposed approach for storing and matching face images
6.3.1 Active Appearance Model
The proposed approach essentially selects host images thatare most likely to be compatible
with the private image based on geometry and appearance. Butthe similarity measures from an
automated face recognition systems are not adequate to select the compatible host face images
from a public dataset. In this work, the Verilook SDK† is used to generate the similarity scores.
We found that the similarity score between the private imagend a candidate host image in a
public dataset is small or almost equal zero, because it is animpostor score form the preceptive
of a face matcher. So using a face matcher are not the suitableway to select compatible hosts.
Therefore, an Active Appearance Model (AAM) [133] that characterizes the shape and texture
of the face is utilized to determine the similarity between the private face image and candidate
host images (Figure 6.9). The steps for building the AAM and using it for locating predefined
landmarks on face features, as shown in Figure 6.10, is discussed in detail in [134] and [133] and
†http://www.neurotechnology.com
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is summarized below.
Figure 6.10: Example of an annotated face
Building the Active Appearance Model
Four steps are needed for building a basic Active AppearanceModel (AAM) from a set of
training images.
Annotate the training set First, for each face image in the training dataset, its face features
are annotated manually by landmarks of a pre-defined shape. Each shapeXj is stored in a vector
format, wherej ∈ 1, .., s ands is the number of training images. This representation does nt
include any information about the connection between landmarks. Thus,
Xj = [x1j , x2j , x3j , . . . , xnj, y1j, y2j, y3j, . . . ynj]
T , (6.4)
wheren is the number of landmarks used to locate and annotate face fetures.
Building the shape model A shape alignment process is performed to remove the effectsof
affine transformations (translation, scaling and rotation). Then the Principle Component Analysis
(PCA) is used to construct a simple linear model of shape variability across the training images:
X = X̄+ Φsbs. (6.5)
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Here,X̄ is the mean shape vector,Φs is a matrix describing the modes of variation derived
from the training set andbs is the shape model parameters vector.
Building the texture model All images in the training set are warped to the mean shape by
utilizing the annotated landmarks. Next, the pixel values in each warped image is consolidated
to create a texture vector. Then, a photometric normalization is used to minimize the effects of
lighting changes on the texture vector. The normalized textur vector isg:
g = [g1, g2, g3 . . . gm]
T , (6.6)
wherem is the number of pixels within the image. Then, PCA is used to linearly model the
texture vectors as in equation6.7.
g = ḡ + Φgbg. (6.7)
Here,ḡ is the mean texture vector,Φg is the modes of variation matrix andbg is the texture
model parameter vector.
Building the combined Active Appearance Model (AAM) Shape and texture are often corre-
lated [134] and, so, PCA is once again used to construct a compact model fromX andg resulting
in a set of combined parametersC. This helps in synthesizing an image with a given shapeX
and textureg using one set of parametersC as shown below.
X = X̄+ ΦsC, (6.8)
g = ḡ + ΦgC. (6.9)
Annotating an Image
A randomly selected template model is initially generated an n image based on the corre-
sponding model parameters is synthesized. The error between th input image (Iimage, that has
to be annotated) and the synthesized image (Isynthesized) needs to be minimized. The solution
is found by varying two sets of parameters: the combined model parametersC and the pose
parameters (translation, scaling and rotation).
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6.3.2 Selection of Hosts
For selecting compatible hosts, the cost of registering (ali ning) each image in the public
dataset with the private image is computed asTc. These costs are sorted in order to locate two
host images,Hs1 andHs2, which have the smallest registration cost. However, as will be shown
in the experiments section, this cost alone is not sufficient. So the texture is used as an additional
criteria and the cost associated with this is denoted asAc. Therefore, the final costFc, which
is associated with each host image, is the sum of the normalized transformation costTc and
the normalized appearance costAc. The simple min-max normalization technique is used to
normalize both costs.
Transformation Cost Tc
This cost measures the amount of geometric transformation necessary to align two images
based on the annotated landmarks generated by the AAM. Giventhe set of correspondences
between these finite sets of points on two face images, a transformationT : R2 → R2 can
be estimated to map any point from one set to the other. While tere are several choices for
modeling this geometric transformation, the thin plate spline (TPS) model is used [135]. The
transformation cost,Tc, is the measure of how much transformation is needed to alignthe two
face images by utilizing the thin plate spline model, which is the bending energy necessary to
perform the transformation.
Appearance CostAc
First, the private face image(O) and the host image(H) are normalized by warping them
to the mean shape,̄X, resulting in shape-free texture imagesO′ andH ′. Figures 6.11 shows
an example of a shape-free image for a private face image. This normalization step uses the
mean shape computed during the AAM training phase. Each shape-free image is represented as
a texture vector (equation 6.6).
BothO′ andH ′ can be expressed by the texture model parameter vector,bg. In order to get




g · {g− ḡ} (6.10)
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Figure 6.11: The shape-free image of annotated face image inFigure 6.10
The appearance cost,Ac, is defined as the Manhattan distance between the basis vectors corre-
sponding toO′ andH ′.
6.3.3 Image Registration and Cropping
In this step, the global affine transformation component of the thin plate spline model is used
to align the two selected host images (Hs1 ,Hs2) with the secret image (O). Next, the aligned hosts
and the secret image are cropped to capture only the facial features which have been located by
AAM as illustrated in Figure 6.10.
6.3.4 Secret Encryption and Reconstruction By Mixing Host Images
GEVCS is used to hide the secret image,O, in the two host imagesHs1 andHs2 resulting in
two sheets denoted asS1 andS2, respectively.S1 andS2 are mixed by superimposing them in
order to reveal the secret private image. The final target image is obtained by the reconstruction
process that reverses the pixel expansion step to retain theoriginal image size.
6.4 Experiments and Results
The performance of the proposed technique was tested on two different databases: the IMM
and XM2VTS databases. These databases were used since the facial landmarks of individual
images were annotated and available online. These annotations were necessary for the AAM
scheme. The IMM Face Database [136] is an annotated databasecontaining 6 face images each
of 40 different subjects; 3 of the frontal face images per subject were used in the experiments. 27
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subjects were used to construct the private dataset and the remaining 13 were used as the public
dataset. The XM2VTS frontal image database [105] consists of 8 frontal face images each of
295 subjects. 192 of these subjects were used to construct the private dataset and 91 subjects
were used to construct the pubic dataset. The remaining subjects were excluded because several
of their face images could not be processed by the commercialmatcher. The composition of the
public dataset is shown in Figure 6.12. Figure 6.13 shows examples of the proposed approach
when dataset D in Figure 6.12 is used as the public dataset (her [L = 0, K = 0.75] and the pixel
expansion valuem is 36). The AAM for each database was constructed using the face images
(one per subject) from the public dataset.
In the following experiments, the match scores were generated using the Verilook SDK‡. In
order to establish a baseline, the images in the private database were first matched against each
other. This resulted in an EER of∼ 6% for the IMM database and∼ 2% for the XM2VTS
database.
Computational time We evaluated the time complexity of the approach usingMatlab R©-2013a
on a PC withIntel R© i7 CPU @2.8GHz and 8GB memory. The elapsed time of decomposing a
private face image into two host image is 1.5 seconds.
6.4.1 Experiment 1
In this experiment, the impact of varying the number of images in the public dataset was
investigated (datasets A, B, C, D and E were used). The selection of hosts from the public dataset
was based only on the transformation cost. The experiment consisted of matching the mixed
private images against each other. EERs using the 5 public datasets are shown in Tables 6.1 and
6.2. For the IMM database in Table 6.1, it is clear that addingmore images to the public dataset
initially improves the result. However, dataset E results in the worst EER with respect to the
other datasets. This drop in performance could be attributed to the inclusion of an individual with
a beard in the public dataset: the absence of the appearance cost l d to the selection of this host
image even for those private face images that did not possessa beard, thereby affecting the mixed
images.
‡http://www.neurotechnology.com
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(a) IMM Database
(b) XM2VTS Database
Figure 6.12: Images in the public datasets for both the IMM and XM2VTS databases
Table 6.1: Equal Error Rates (%) when using different publicdatasets withK = 0.567 andm=16
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Figure 6.13: Illustration of the proposed approach using images from the IMM Database
Table 6.2: Equal Error Rates (%) when using different publicdatasets withK = 0.875 andm=36
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6.4.2 Experiment 2
In this experiment, the appearance cost was added to the criterion to select the host images
and it is clear that this solves the problem encountered in experiment 1. Dataset E is used in this
experiment to select the hosts (H1, H2). Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show the EERs of the mixed images
when host images are selected using (a) the transformation costTc only and (b) the sum of the
normalized transformation costTc and appearance costAc.
From both the above experiments it is also apparent thatK = 0.875 andm=36 results in better
matching performance.
Table 6.3: Equal Error Rates (%) when different selection criteria are used withK = 0.567 and
m=16
Selection Criteria IMM Database XM2VTS Database
Tc 11.4 22
Tc + Ac 8 21
Table 6.4: Equal Error Rates (%) when different selection criteria are used withK = 0.875 and
m=36
Selection Criteria IMM Database XM2VTS Database
Tc 3.4 10.2
Tc + Ac 2 6
6.4.3 Experiment 3
The purpose of this experiment was to determine if the mixed face images upon reconstruction
could be successfully matched against the original privatef c images. To evaluate this, the
public Dataset A in Figure 6.12, consisting of two fixed face images as hosts, was used. For
each subject in the private dataset, one frontal face image was selected§ as the secret image to
be encrypted by mixing the two host face images. The visual cryptography scheme was invoked
with contrastK = 0.875 and a pixel expansion factor ofm = 36. The mixed images were
observed to match very well with the original images resulting in an EER of∼ 0% in the case of
the IMM database and 0.5% in the case of the XM2VTS database. On other hand, when either of
the sheets were matched against the original images, the resultant EERs were greater than 45%.
§In the case of IMM database, the face sample exhibiting neutral expression and diffuse light was selected
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6.4.4 Experiment 4
The purpose of this experiment was to determine if the mixed face images could be success-
fully matched against those images in the private dataset that were not used in Experiment 3. To
establish this, for each subject in the reconstructed dataset,N frontal face images were chosen
from the private database to assemble the gallery (N = 2 for IMM and N = 3 for XM2VTS).
The matching exercise consisted of comparing the reconstructed face images (from Experiment
1) against these gallery images (not used in Experiment 1). An EER of∼ 2% was obtained for
the IMM database. This performance, in this case, was even better than that of the original im-
ages (EER∼ 6%). The improvement could be due to the contrast enhancement of the private
face images that occurs when increasing the dynamic range ofthe sheets resulting in improved
quality of the reconstructed secret image. For the XM2VTS datab se, the obtained EER was∼
6% which is still comparable with the 2% obtained when matching the original images.
6.4.5 Experiment 5
By using public Dataset D andm = 16 and 36, sheet images were created with different con-
trast values:K = 0.567, 0.6888, 0.75, 0.875. Table 6.5 reports the Equal Error Rates (EERs) for
these different values ofK. Here, the matching procedure was the same as that of Experiment 4.
For both databases,K = 0.875 results in better performance than the other values. This improve-
ment could be due to the contrast enhancement of the target images that occurs by increasing the
dynamic range of the sheets and, consequently, the quality of the mixed image.
Table 6.5: Equal Error Rates (%) for different values ofK andm = 16. The choice ofK is based
on [11]






Next, the effect of pixel expansion on the final reconstructed image was tested. Figure 6.14
shows that details of the sheets can appear on the final image for higher values ofm. The impact
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of m on matching performance is shown in Table 6.7. Here, the matching procedure was the
same as that of Experiment 4. The host images were selected from Dataset D withK = 0.567.
As shown in Figure 6.14, the pixel expansion value affects the number of gray-levels in the
reconstructed image, and this impacts the amount of detail appearing in it. Therefore, whenm is
100, the visual details of the sheet images appear on the reconstructed image resulting in a drop
in overall performance.
(a) m=4 (b) m=16 (c) m=36 (d) m=100
Figure 6.14: Examples of mixed images for a subject with different values for the pixel expansion
factor,m
6.4.7 Experiment 7
In this experiment, the possibility of exposing the identity of the secret image by using the
sheet images in the matching process is investigated. For this experiment, the sheet images for 3
Table 6.6: Equal Error Rates (%) for different values ofK andm = 36. The choice ofK is based
on [11]





Table 6.7: Equal Error Rates for different values ofm (%)
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different face samples of the same subject were first computed. N xt, the mixed images and the
corresponding sheets were independently used in the matching process (i.e., sheet image 1 of all
the private images were matched against each other; sheet image 2 of all the private images were
matched against each other; mixed images of all the private images were matched against each
other). Figure 6.15 shows that each subject in the private dataset has three reconstructed images.
The public datasets used in this experiments were datasets A, F and G. This experiment resulted
in three EERs: the first was a result of using the reconstructed mixed images for matching, while
the second and the third EERs were a result of using the first sheet and second sheet, respectively,
for matching. The results in Table 6.8 confirm the difficulty of exposing the identity of the secret
face image by using the sheets alone.
Note that experiment 7 involves automatic host selection frm the public dataset based on the
registration cost,Fc, described earlier. The positive impact of automatic host selection is seen in
Figure 6.15 where the selected host images (sheets) and the secret image are observed to have
compatible expressions.
6.4.8 Experiment 8
Different applications may employ different public datasets for host image selection. Thus,
the hosts selected for encrypting an individual’s face image can differ across applications. This
experiment seeks to confirm that cross-matching of the stored sh ets across applications (and
inferring identities) will not be feasible. To demonstratethis, the possibility of using host images
from differentpublic databases for encrypting the same identity (i.e., face image) was investi-
gated. The experiment was set up as follows. Two face samplesof ach of the 192 subjects in
the XM2VTS private dataset were randomly selected. For an arbitr y subject, letO1 andO2
denote the two face samples that were selected. Further, letO1 be encrypted into sheetsSIMM1
andSIMM2 using a public dataset from the IMM database. Similarly, letO2 be encrypted into
sheetsSXM2V TS1 andS
XM2V TS
2 using a public dataset from the XM2VTS database. LetT1 and
T2 denote the reconstructed face images pertaining toO1 andO2, respectively. The following
matching exercises were conducted: (a)SIMM1 againstS
XM2V TS











2 ; (e)T1 againstT2. The public datasets
used in this experiment was the same as Experiment 7 (i.e., Datasets A , F and G). Table 6.9
shows the EERs for these matching experiments and it is clearthat it is difficult to perform cross-




Figure 6.15: Examples from experiment 7 where (a), (d) and (g) are the first sheets and (b), (e)
and (h) are the second sheets. (c), (f) and (i) are the corresponding mixed face images
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Table 6.8: Equal Error Rates (%) for Experiment 7. Experiments confirm the difficulty of using
sheet images to reveal the secret image
EER (%)
Mixed vs Mixed 2.4
Sheet 1 vs Sheet 1 44.7
Sheet 2 vs Sheet 2 44.2
(a) IMM Database: Dataset A
EER (%)
Mixed vs Mixed 6.2
Sheet 1 vs Sheet 1 36.0
Sheet 2 vs Sheet 2 33.8
(b) XM2VTS Database: Dataset A
EER (%)
Mixed vs Mixed 7.4
Sheet 1 vs Sheet 1 35.7
Sheet 2 vs Sheet 2 40
(c) IMM Database: Dataset F
EER (%)
Mixed vs Mixed 8.2
Sheet 1 vs Sheet 1 31.7
Sheet 2 vs Sheet 2 38.3
(d) XM2VTS Database: Dataset F
EER (%)
Mixed vs Mixed 6.8
Sheet 1 vs Sheet 1 33.8
Sheet 2 vs Sheet 2 39.5
(e) IMM Database: Dataset G
EER (%)
Mixed vs Mixed 9.2
Sheet 1 vs Sheet 1 37.8
Sheet 2 vs Sheet 2 39.3
(f) XM2VTS Database: Dataset G
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matching across different applications. However, when thecorresponding reconstructed images
(m = 36 andK = 0.875) are compared, the resulting EER suggests the possibility of successful
matching.















































This chapter explored the possibility of decomposing facesfor imparting privacy to private
face images. The contribution of this chapter includes a methodology to protect the privacy of a
face database by decomposing an input private face image into two independent face images such
that the private face image can be reconstructed by mixing these modified host face images. The
proposed algorithm selects the host images that are most likely to be compatible with the secret
image based on geometry and appearance. GEVCS is then used toencrypt the private image
in the selected host images. It is observed that when the encrypted host images (i.e., sheets)
are mixed they are similar to the original private images. The study on the effect of various
parameters (K andm) on the matching performance suggests that there is indeed ar lation
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between the quality of the reconstructed secret and these parameters. Finally, experimental results
demonstrate the difficulty of exposing the identity of the secret image by using only one of the
sheets; further individual sheets cannot be used to performcross-matching between different
applications. Increasing the pixel expansion factor,m, can lead to an increase in the storage
requirements for the sheets. In the recent literature thereav been some efforts to develop a
visual cryptography scheme without pixel expansion [137] [138]. But no such scheme currently
exists for generating sheets that are not random noisy images. Thus, more work is necessary to
handle this problem.
6.5.1 Research Contribution
• Introducing a new privacy structure for de-identifying face images.





In the previous chapters we discussed different approachesto generate a mixed biometric
image. The mixed images have the following properties: (a) incorporate characteristics from
component images, and (b) can be used directly in the featureext action and matching stages
of an existing biometric system. However, we only discussedapproaches to mix images of a
single biometric trait (i.e., mixing fingerprints, faces and irises). In this chapter, we demonstrate
that the concept of mixing biometrics can be extended to mixdifferentbiometric traits such as
fingerprints with irises. By mixing samples from these two different traits, a new, unique, and
revocable biometric image can be generated. Specifically, the goal here is generating a new mixed
image that inherits its uniqueness from a finger impression and an iris image. The uniqueness
of a fingerprint is determined by the topographic relief of its r dge structure and the presence of
certain ridge irregularities termed as minutiae. Whereas the human iris, which is the annular part
between the pupil and the white sclera, contains intricate textural details. The iris and fingerprint
patterns are believed to be unique to each eye and to each finger, respectively. Therefore, the
process of iris or fingerprint recognition is done by analyzing these patterns and comparing it
with that of an entry in the gallery.
The mixing process of fingerprint and iris begins by decomposing the fingerprint image into
two different components, viz., the continuous and spiral components. The continuous com-
ponent defines the local ridge orientation, and the spiral component characterizes the minutiae
locations [74]. Next, the spiral component of the iris is computed by locating minutiae on the iris
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texture; in order to avoid loss of information due to normaliz t on [66], a segmented iris image
(i.e., annular region) is used directly in the minutiae determination step. A Gabor filter is applied
to capture the iris texture and the minutiae considered to behe centroids of iris regions that result
in consistent filter responses. Finally, the continuous comp nent of the fingerprint is combined
with the spiral of the iris image to create a new biometric image. This new and unique biometric
image appears as a fingerprint image and has been denoted in this work as afing’iris’print .
Figure 7.1: Illustration of the proposed approach to generate afing’iris’print .
This work confirms that (a) a new biometric image (i.e., fing’iris print) can be created by
fusing two different biometric traits (i.e., a fingerprint and an iris); (b) the new fing’iris’print can
potentially be used for authentication; and (c) it can be used to obscure the information present in
an individual’s fingerprint and iris images, and can be stored in a central database instead of the
original templates. Therefore, this approach can be used togenerate a cancelable template (i.e.,
the template can be reset if the fing’iris’print is compromised), and different applications can mix
different fingers with an iris image from the right or left eye, thereby ensuring that the identities
enrolled in one application cannot be matched against the identities in another application.
Section 7.2 presents the proposed approach of generating a fi’iris’print by fusing a finger-
print with an iris image. Section 7.3 reports the experimental results and section 7.4 summarizes
the chapter.
7.2 Generating Fing’iris’print
Fingerprints have been fused with irises at the feature [139, 40], score [141], rank [142]
levels. The only work, based on our knowledge, that generates n image by fusing the raw
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data of different biometric traits is Noore et al.’s work [58]. They developed a fusion algorithm
based on multi-level discrete wavelet transform to fuse images of four biometric traits (i.e., face,
iris, fingerprint, and signature). The resultant image [58]is a scrambled image that cannot be
used directly in the matching step; therefore, special reconstruction procedures are needed to
reconstruct the original images and to perform authentication. This exposes the original biometric
templates to eavesdroppers during every identification/verification attempt.
In contrast, the mixed image generated in our work (i.e., fing’iris’print) has the following
properties: (a) incorporates characteristics from the fingerprint and iris images, (b) can be used
directly in the feature extraction and matching stages of anexisting fingerprint system, and (c)
obscures the identity of the component images. As shown in Figure 7.1, there are three distinct
phases in the generation of a fing’iris’print: determining continuous phase of the fingerprint,
determining minutiae of the iris, and mixing.
7.2.1 Continuous Phase Determination
The ridge flow of a fingerprint can be represented as a 2D Amplitude and Frequency Modu-
lated (AM-FM) signal [74]:
F (x, y) = a(x, y) + b(x, y)cos(ΨF (x, y)) + n(x, y), (7.1)
whereF (x, y) is the intensity of the original image at(x, y), a(x, y) is the intensity offset,b(x, y)
is the amplitude,ΨF (x, y) is the phase andn(x, y) is the noise. Based on the Helmholtz Decom-
position Theorem [75], the phase can be uniquely decomposedinto the continuous phase and the
spiral phase,ΨF i(x, y) = ψFc (x, y)+ψ
F
s (x, y). As shown in Figure 7.2, the cosine of the contin-
uous phase, i.e., the continuous componentcos(ψFc (x, y)), defines the local ridge orientation, and
the cosine of the spiral phase, i.e., the spiral componentcos(ψFs (x, y)), characterizes the minutiae
locations.
Since ridges and minutiae can be completely determined by the phase [74], we are only
interested inΨF (x, y). The other three parameters in Equation (7.1) contribute tohe realistic
textural appearance of the fingerprint. To mix a fingerprint with an iris, first, the phaseΨF (x, y)
of the component fingerprint must be reliably estimated; this is termed as demodulation [74]
[143]. Next, the phase (ΨF (x, y)) of the fingerprint image is decomposed into a continuous
Asem A. Othman Chapter 7. Finger’iris’print 115
(a)
(b) (c)
Figure 7.2: Decomposing a fingerprint. (a) A fingerprint image. (b) Continuous component,
cos(ψFc (x, y)). (c) Spiral component,cos(ψ
F
s (x, y)). The blue and pink dots represent ridge
endings and ridge bifurcations, respectively.
phase (ψFc (x, y)) and a spiral phase (ψ
F
s (x, y)) [75]. The continuous phaseψ
F
c (x, y) pertaining
to the fingerprint will be added during the mixing process to the generated spiral phase (ψIc x, y))
from the iris image in order to construct the fing’iris’printimage. In the following sub-section,
the detailed steps for locating iris minutiae, in order to generate the spiral phase (ψIs (x, y)) of an
iris image, is described.
7.2.2 Iris Minutiae
Before discussing our proposed approach for determining iris minutiae, the properties of ideal
iris minutiae is defined below.
Repeatability Given two iris images of the same eye, acquired during different sessions, the
determined minutia should be found in the same position in both images. Specifically, determi-
nation of iris minutiae should be invariant and robust regardless of the presence of noise (e.g.,
eyelids, eyelashes, reflections, or occlusions); the use ofdifferent sensors; and the different image
properties like size, compression, or format.
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Distinctiveness Given two iris images of two different eyes, the determined minutiae should
have good discriminatory ability over different eyes. Specifically, any two persons should be
sufficiently different in terms of iris minutiae.
Quantity The number of determined iris minutiae should be sufficient,such that the generated
fing’iris’print has a reasonable number of minutiae to be processed by a fingerprint matcher.
Specifically, the average number of minutiae of fing’iris’prints should be close to the average
number of minutiae in the original fingerprints (i.e., for FVC2002-db2, which is the database
used in our experiments, the average number of minutiae is 45). Ideally, the number of detected
minutiae should be adaptable over a large range by simple andintuitive parameters. Also they
should reflect the textural content of an iris image to provide a compact representation.
In fingerprint literature [35], there are many well established techniques that extract “ ideal”∗
minutiae from fingerprint images. These techniques are reasonably stable and robust to fin-
gerprint impression conditions.But the texture of an iris is varied, random, and scrambled in
comparison with the texture of a fingerprint; so it is difficult to use the same minutiae-extraction
approaches that are widely used in fingerprint recognition systems. Therefore, rather than using a
few typical minutial structures to describe the local texture information, our approach will utilize
existing iris processing methods.
Daugman’s phase encoding technique is the most common and promising among the different
iris recognition approaches [64] [65] [69]. Figure 7.3 shows the processing chain of the tradi-
tional iris recognition system following Daugman’s approach [70]. First, a camera acquires an
image of an eye and the iris annular region is segmented. Next, the annular iris is geometrically
normalized, i.e., unwrapped from raw image coordinates to pseudo-polar coordinates. A texture
filter is applied to the normalized iris image, and the filter rsponses are quantized into a binary
representation (i.e., iris code). The comparison between two iris codes is done by computing the
fractional hamming distance as a dissimilarity measure.
In this chapter, the same technique will be utilized to extract the local features of the iris
image, i.e., iris minutiae. However, in our approach, the filt r will be applied to the annular iris
region due to the following reasons.
• During the mixing step (see section 7.2.3), the fingerprint component (i.e., the continuous
∗Based on the enumerated properties of ideal minutiae.
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Figure 7.3: Diagram of Daugman’s approach for encoding an iris image.
phase) is pre-aligned to a common coordinates, such that itscore (where ridge orientation
changes abruptly) is at the center of the new image. Therefore, by using the annular iris
image, after the mixing process, the locations of the iris minutiae points will be around the
core point of the fing’iris’print which will be similar to thedistribution of minutiae in a
fingerprint†.
• Unwrapping the annular iris into normalized image can be regarded as a sampling process,
with the inherent possibility of aliasing that may deteriorate the discriminability of the iris’s
texture.
The steps for extracting iris minutiae from annular iris images are described below.
Applying a Gabor filter on the annular iris
A log-Gabor filter is used for capturing the local feature of the annular iris image. So, first, a
Fourier transform is applied to the iris image, and then the values are multiplied by the log-Gabor





†Zhu et al. [144] show that minutiae are not uniformly distributed but tend to cluster around core points.
Asem A. Othman Chapter 7. Finger’iris’print 118
wherefo represents the center frequency andσ is the bandwidth of the filter [116]. Next, an
inverse Fourier transform is applied, yielding a complex-valued filter response for each point
in the image (see Figure 7.4). In a traditional iris recognitio system, each complex number is
quantized to two bits; the first bit is set to one if the real part of the complex number is positive,
and the second bit is set to one if the imaginary part is positive. In our work, the goal is finding key
responses that can be noted as iris minutiae from the responses f the whole image. Therefore, we
applied a sequence of pruning steps on the iris responses in order t locate consistent responses
that will be utilized to locate iris minutiae.
Pruning filter responses
Our goal is to prune the phase responses to find the most consistent and reliable points that
can be marked as iris minutiae. The concept that some responses are less consistent than others
was first mentioned by Bolle et al. [145]. Since then, many researchers have investigated and
studied the consistence (i.e., fragility) of the phase respon es [146]. Hollingsworth et al. [146]
demonstrated that by masking responses near the axes of the complex plane could dramatically
decrease the false rejection rate of an iris template. Note that, the inconsistency of the responses
does not measure the stability or robustness of the iris textur . The inconsistency of an iris region
occurs when the inner product between the log-Gabor filter and a particular region of the annular
iris produces a response with a value close to the complex plane axes [147] [146].
Therefore, as shown in Figure 7.4, to prune the responses of an iris as suggested in [147]
[146], a series of adaptive thresholding was performed (seeFigure 7.4). The first pruning step
eliminated responses corresponding to a portion of filter responses (thc%) closest to the axes.
Then, to exclude the outliers that, in some cases, are due to the specular highlights, a second
threshold parameter (tho) is set for that purpose: real and imaginary responses greater thantho%
of the filter responses are eliminated.
The final pruning is done by considering responses only in a portion of the first quadrant of the
complex plane. Specifically, the responses with angles outside he intervalαθ were eliminated.
In this work, we have empirically set the values of these parameters to be as follows:thc = 90%,
tho = 99%, andαθ = [30, 60].
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(a)
(c) (d)
Figure 7.4: Polar plots of the complex-valued responses of an annular iris image after (b) applying
the filter, (c) pruning usingthc andtho, and (d) pruning usingαθ.
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Locating the minutiae
After pruning, the number of remaining responses is still large because of the rich detailed
texture of the iris image. Figure 7.5-b shows the remaining responses on the annular iris image.
To resolve this, the remaining responses have to be broken upinto meaningful subsets. Therefore,
a hierarchical clustering algorithm that constructs clusters based on distance connectivity, where
the cutoff distance is 5, is used to cluster the remaining iris responses. Finally, the barycenter of
these clusters is considered to be the iris minutiae.
(a) (b)
Figure 7.5: Annotating the phase responses on the annular iris after (a) pruning (i.e., red dots)
and (b) finding the barycenter of their clusters (i.e., blue dots).
Constructing the iris spiral phase (ψIs )
To mix an iris with the continuous phase of a fingerprint, a spiral phase,ψIs (x, y) which
corresponds to the minutiae of the iris has to be computed:





−1((x− xn)/(y − yn)), (7.3)
wherepn is the polarity value,xn andyn denote the coordinates of thenth minutia, andN denotes
the total number of iris minutiae.
Appending this function to a continuous phase of a fingerprint image will cause phase jumps
resulting in minutiae. Depending upon the polarity value (+1 or -1), a minutia is generated on
the ridge pattern. The relation between the polarity,pn, and the occurrence of ridge ending or
bifurcation is dependent on the gradient direction of the cosine of the continuous phase. Hence,
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the spiral phase causes an abrupt change in the local fringe density by either inserting or deleting
a ridge based on the polarity and the appending location within the continuous phase. In this
work, the polarity value will be set to +1. This means that thetype of a fing’iris’print minutia
(i.e., ending or bifurcation) will be based on the fingerprint pattern at the appending location of
an iris minutia.
Moreover, as shown in Figure 7.6-a, appending the spiral phase of an annular iris to a con-
tinuous phase of a fingerprint can result in a visually unrealistic fingerprint image. This is due
to difference in the spatial distribution and frequencies of iris minutiae and real fingerprint minu-
tiae. To resolve this issue (see Figure 7.6-b), the spiral phse of each iris minutia is tuned to the
corresponding local ridge frequency and orientation of thefingerprint component by using Gabor
bandpass filters [78].
The form of the Gabor elementary function that is oriented atan angle0◦ is given as;












wheref represents the local ridge frequency of the fingerprint where iris minutia will be ap-
pended, andδx andδy are the space constants of the filter envelope alongx andy axes, respec-
tively. Their values determine the trade between enhancement and spurious artifacts. In this
work, we have empirically set the values ofδx andδy to be 5 (as suggested in [78]). Note that
the filters have been tuned to the corresponding local ridge orientation of fingerprint component
at the appended iris minutiae by rotating the elementary kernel.
7.2.3 Mixing
Prior to mixing, the continuous component of the fingerprintimage is pre-aligned to a com-
mon coordinate system by utilizing a reference point and itsorientation. In this work, Nilsson
et al.’s [148][149] approach to detect the reference pointswa adopted. This approach has the
advantage of being able to extract the position and spatial orientation of the reference point si-
multaneously. The reference point is used to translate the component to the center of the annular
iris image and its orientation is used to find a rotation angleabout the reference point. This angle
rotates the fingerprint component to make the reference orientat on orthogonal to the horizontal
axis.
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(a) (b)
Figure 7.6: (a) An example of a fing’iris’print that looks unrealistic. (b) Enhancing the appear-
ance by using Gabor bandpass filters tuned to the orientationnd frequency of the continuous
component.
Let F andI be a fingerprint and an annular iris image, respectively,ψFc (x, y) be the continu-
ous component determined fromF , andψIs (x, y) be the spiral component determined fromI. A
fing’iris’print (MFI) can be generated as:
MFI = cos(ψc + ψs). (7.5)
The continuous phase ofF is combined with the spiral phase ofI which generates a new biomet-
ric imageMFI.
7.3 Experiments and Discussion
The proposed approach to generate fing’iris’prints was tested using a fingerprint and an iris
dataset. The iris dataset was taken from the UPOL‡ iris database. The UPOL database has high
quality iris images of the left and right eye of 64 users whichare mostly unoccluded by eyelids or
lashes. The used dataset consists of 2 samples of the left eyeresulting in a total of 128 iris images
which were manually segmented and converted to grayscale. In order to establish a baseline
performance, an open source Matlab implementation [116] based on the Daugman’s approach
‡http://www.inf.upol.cz/iris/
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[117] was used to encode and match the irises. For each iris, one image was added to the probe
set (PI) and the other one was added to the gallery,GI . Matching the probe set against the gallery
set resulted in a rank-1 accuracy of∼ 99% and EER of∼ 0%.
The fingerprint dataset was taken from the FVC2002-DB2 database. In this work, we used
the first 2 impression of the first 64 fingers in the FVC2002-DB2database resulting in a total
of 128 fingerprint images (as in the case of the iris dataset).The baseline performance of the
fingerprint dataset was determined by adding one impressionof each finger to the probe set and
the other to the gallery set. Matching the probe set (PF ) against the gallery set (GF ) by using the
verifinger SDK§ resulted in a rank-1 accuracy of∼ 99% and EER of∼ 0%.
With regards to generating fing’iris’prints for obscuring the original component images, the
following key questions are raised:
1. Can two mixed impressions pertaining to the same identitybe successfully matched?
2. Can the original fingerprint and the fing’iris’print be linked?
3. Can the original iris and the fing’iris’print be linked?
It is essential to assure that the proposed approach prevents identity linking, by preventing the
possibility of successfully matching the original fingerprint or iris image with the mixed image.
Computational time We evaluated the time complexity of the proposed approach usingMatlab R©-
2013a on a PC withIntel R© i7 CPU @2.8GHz and 8GB memory. As shown in Figure 7.1, there
are three main steps for generating a fing’iris’print: Continuous phase Determination, Iris Minu-
tiae Determination and Mixing. Table 7.1 shows the elapsed time of each step.
Table 7.1: Elapsed time of generating a fing’iris’print as shown in Figure 7.1
Task Time (seconds)
Continuous phase Determination 10
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7.3.1 Matching Performance
The purpose of this experiment was to report the matching performance of fing’iris’print. The
annular iris of each eye in the probe setPI were mixed with a fingerprint image from the probe
setPF resulting in a new probe setMFIP consisting of 64 fing’iris’prints. The corresponding
pairs of fingerprints inGF were also mixed with annular iris inGI resulting in a new gallery
setMFIG consisting of 64 fing’iris’prints. Figure 7.7 shows examples of mixed image. In this
work, the parameters of the log-Gabor filter, i.e., (1/fo) the center wavelength and (σ/fo) the
bandwidth of the filter, were set to be 12 and 0.5, respectively. By matching the probe and gallery
sets of fing’iris’prints, the obtained rank-1 accuracy was∼ 92% and the EER was∼ 10%. This
indicates the possibility of matching fing’iris’prints. However, further work should be done to
improve the rank-1 accuracy. Currently, different parameters values (i.e.,thc, tho, αtheta, and
clustering cutoff) along with different methods to locate iris minutiae are being examined. Note
that the Gabor filter parameters have no noticeable effect onthe results as shown in Tables 7.2
and 7.3.












7.3.2 Exposing the original identities from fing’iris’prin ts
In this experiment, the possibility of exposing the identity of the FVC2002-DB2 fingerprint
image or UPOL iris image by using the fing’iris’print images was investigated.
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Figure 7.7: Examples of fing’iris’print where fingerprints are from the FVC2002-DB2 dataset
and irises are from UPOL dataset.
First, the impressions inMFIG were matched against the original fingerprint images inPF .
The resultant rank-1 accuracy was 0% and the EER was more than43%. Second, the annular
iris in PI was matched against fing’iris’print impressions inMFIG. But the mixed images are
fingerprint images that share only the minutiae locations ofthe annular iris images. Therefore,
to perform the experiment, the minutiae location of the fing’iris’print and the annular iris were
matched using a point pattern matching algorithm utilizingthe RANdom SAmple Consensus
(RANSAC) method [150]. The resultant rank-1 accuracy was 0%and the EER was 48%.
These results suggest that the original identity cannot be easily deduced from the mixed im-
age. However, more formal analysis of different security aspects (such as the non-invertiblity and
cancelability of the approach) is necessary.
7.4 Summary
In this chapter, the concept of mixing biometrics was exploited in the context of mixing
different biometric traits, i.e., fingerprints with irises. A fingerprint image and an annular iris
image are mixed in order to generate a fing’iris’print image.This mixed image incorporates
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characteristics from the original fingerprint impression and the orignal iris image, and can be used
directly in the feature extraction and matching stages of anexisting fingerprint system. To mix a
fingerprint with an iris, the fingerprint is decomposed into tw components, viz., the continuous
and spiral phases , and iris minutiae is extracted in order togenerate the iris spiral phase. In
the final step of mixing, the continuous phase of the fingerprint is combined with the spiral
phase of the annular iris image resulting in a new fingerprintimage. Our experiments conducted
on fingerprint and iris datasets show that (a) the new biometric image (i.e., fing’iris’print) can
potentially be used for authentication, and (b) the original fi gerprint and iris images cannot be
easily matched with the mixed image.
7.4.1 Research Contribution
• Designing a new cancelability structure for fingerprint andiris templates.
• Generating a fingerprint image from a fingerprint and iris image.
• Proposing an approach to extract iris minutiae by utilizingthe concept of bit fragility.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
8.1 Conclusions
The emergence of biometrics has facilitated the rapid authentication of individuals based on
their biological traits. In a biometric system, each reference template stored in the database is
usually associated with only a single individual. While indivi uals can be independently authenti-
cated based on their respective biometric templates, in this thesis we investigated whether a single
biometric template can be generated from multiple individuals. In other words, we explored the
possibility of generating a biometric template representing a joint identity that inherits its char-
acteristics from two different individuals. Mixing biometrics refers to the process of generating
a new biometric signal by fusing signals of different biometrics instances pertaining to a single
individual or different individuals. The generated mixed image incorporates characteristics from
the original biometrics images, and can be used directly in the feature extraction and matching
stages of an existing biometric system. The utility of mixing biometrics was demonstrated in
two different applications. The first application dealt with the issue of generating a joint digital
identity. The second application dealt with the issue of biometric privacy, where the concept of
mixing was used for de-identifying or obscuring biometric images.
After introducing the concept of mixing biometrics and its benefits in the first chapter, in the
second chapter we gave a brief introduction to biometric trats considered in this thesis.
In the third chapter, a method to mix fingerprint images was presented. It was demonstrated
that the concept of “mixing fingerprints” could be utilized to (a) generate a new identity by mixing
two distinct fingerprints and (b) de-identify a fingerprint by mixing it with another fingerprint.
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In the fourth chapter, a method to mix face images was introduce . It was demonstrated that
the concept of “mixing faces” could be used to generate virtual identities. The mixed face image
is the mid-face in the morphing continuum between the two comp nent faces and its position on
this continuum is specified by the mixing parameters. Our experiments showed that (a) the mixed
face representing a new identity can potentially be used forauthentication, (b) the mixed face has
similarities with both the original faces, and (c) the proposed method can be utilized to generate
a database of virtual identities.
In the fifth chapter, iris images were mixed in order to (a) generate a virtual identity and (b)
generate mixed images that have similarities with both the component iris images. To mix two
irises, horizontal seams were copied from normalized iris images after sorting them based on
their importance in the images. Experiments on the CASIA-v3dataset show that (a) the mixed
iris representing a new identity can potentially be used forauthentication, (b) the mixed iris is
similar to the original irises, and (c) the proposed method can be utilized to generate a database
of virtual identities from a fixed iris dataset.
In the sixth chapter, we explored the possibility of decomposing faces for imparting privacy
to private face images. We proposed a novel method to protectth privacy of a face database
by decomposing an input private face image into two independent face images such that the
private face image can be reconstructed by mixing these modified host face images. The proposed
algorithm selects the host images that are most likely to be compatible with the private image
based on geometry and appearance. The difficulty of exposingthe identity of the private image
by using only one of the modified hosts was demonstrated; further, individual hosts cannot be
used to perform cross-matching between different applications.
Finally, we extended the concept of mixing to mix instances of different biometric traits.
Specifically, a fingerprint image and an annular iris image were mixed in order to generate a
fing’iris’print. To mix a fingerprint with an iris, the fingerpint was decomposed into two compo-
nent, viz., the continuous and spiral phases, and iris minutiae was extracted in order to generate
the iris spiral phase. Extracting the iris minutiae was doneby using a one-dimensional log-Gabor
filter. The ensuing iris responses were pruned in order to locate a few iris points that were labeled
as iris minutiae. In the final step of mixing, the continuous phase of the fingerprint is combined
with the spiral phase of the annular iris image resulting in anew fingerprint image. Experiments
showed that (a) the new biometric image (i.e., fing’iris’print) can potentially be used for authen-
Asem A. Othman Chapter 8 Conclusions and Future Work 129
tication, and (b) the original fingerprint and iris images cannot be easily matched with the mixed
image.
8.2 Future Research
We conclude this thesis by suggesting possible ways in whicht e research presented here
may be expanded.
• The concept of mixing can be further generalized to develop agroup authentication system
[151]. In such a system, biometric images of a group of individuals can be used for authen-
tication. The group authentication can be designed for group-oriented applications. This
could be used in scenarios where the authentication is no longer based on a single individ-
ual unlike most of the conventional biometric systems. In group authentication, access is
granted only ifk or more of the authorized individuals are simultaneously providing their
biometric traits.
• The performances of mixing fingerprints and generating fing’iris’print can be enhanced
and improved by exploring alternate algorithms for pre-aligning the biometric images, and
for decomposing and representing the texture of fingerprints a d irises.
• In the fourth chapter, we discussed a technique to mix face images to generate an inter-
personal face image that is similar to the original face images. As future work, different
approaches can be investigated to generate a face image thatis dissimilar to the original
face images. Also, the possibility of combining more than two face images has to be stud-
ied. Another application would be the deliberate distortion of the soft biometric attributes
such as age, gender, race, etc. of a person’s face image by mixing it with a public face
image (e.g., a celebrity) that has opposite attributes, as shown in Figure 8.1. While this
perturbs the soft biometric attributes of the face, the mixed mage can still be used to match
with another face image of the person. But a more formal analysis is needed to derive a
privacy measure that can be utilized to validate the usability of the technique.
• In chapter 7, the experimental results suggested that the identity corresponding to the orig-
inal iris and fingerprint images cannot be easily deduced from the mixed image. However,
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Figure 8.1: Examples of interpersonal face images. Here, the images to be mixed have different
soft biometric attributes.
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a more formal analysis of different security aspects (such as t e non-invertiblity and cance-
lability of the approach) is necessary. Further, more investigation is needed to study if the
similarity (i.e., compatibility) between the extracted iris minutiae and the component fin-
gerprint minutiae could leak any information about the original fingerprint (i.e., the original
identity). Therefore, in order to increase security and mini ze the linkage, the similarity
between the iris minutiae and the fingerprint should be measur d and if there is a possibility
to select between different pairs of irises and fingers, the pair with the least compatibility
measure should be mixed.
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